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Most technical standards-development organizations (SDOs) have adopted internal policies 
embodying “due process” criteria such as openness, balance of interests, consensus decision 
making and appeals. These requirements arise from numerous sources including antitrust law, 
international trade law, public procurement requirements and institutional norms. Yet balance 
criteria lack a generally-accepted definition and the manner in which they are implemented 
varies, sometimes dramatically, among SDOs. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the 
principle that SDOs should ensure a balance of interests among their stakeholders, including in 
the development of intellectual property rights policies. This article explores the origins and 
meaning of the balance requirement for SDOs and identifies distinct modalities in which balance 
requirements are imposed, as well as existing antitrust and competition law requirements 
surrounding SDO balance. 
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Non-governmental standards-development organizations (SDOs) have operated in the United 
States and Europe for more than a century, serving as neutral fora for the collaborative 
development of technical interoperability standards and protocols. In order to achieve broad 
acceptance and legitimacy of their standards, SDOs have long sought some degree of “balance of 
interests” among different interests, typically encouraging active participation by product 
manufacturers, product users and unaffiliated experts. 1  Conversely, courts and antitrust 
enforcement agencies have come to view a lack of balance among participants in standard-setting 
activities as undesirable and sometimes of legal concern. Accordingly, balance requirements have 
been embodied in the policies of most major SDOs – one of several “due process” features that, 
along with openness, consensus decision making and an appeals process, seek to ensure the overall 
fairness of the standardization process. Similarly, a significant number of public regulations list 
balance among the procedural features of standards development that SDOs are expected to follow. 
Today, balance requirements are an accepted feature of SDO organization, and most stakeholders 
view them as desirable.2   
 
But what does “balance of interests” mean in an SDO comprised of self-selected volunteer 
participants – both individuals and organizations – and how can (and should) it be achieved?  In 
this article, we explore the history of SDO balance requirements, as well as the legal and 
institutional implications of different interpretations of this important principle. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Part II, we discuss the origins of 
balance requirements in the international standardization movement, then move in Parts III and IV 
to chart the development of balance requirements in the United States and the European Union. In 
Part V, we offer a comparative analysis of different balance requirements along two different axes: 
the types of interests that should be balanced, and the level of balance that SDOs are expected or 




1 JOANNE YATES & CRAIG N. MURPHY, ENGINEERING RULES: GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING SINCE 1880 at 9, 194 
(2019). 
2 See Justus Baron, Jorge Contreras, Martin Husovec & Pierre Larouche, Making the Rules: The Governance of 
Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy 
Report EUR 29655 at 119 (Nikolaus Thumm, ed., Mar. 2019) [hereinafter JRC Report] (89% of surveyed 
stakeholders believed that “SDOs should ensure balance among different types of stakeholders when considering a 
significant new policy or policy change”). 
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II. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 
 
Standards generally fall into one of three broad categories: measurement, performance and 
compatibility.3  Measurement standards establish uniform systems for measuring quantities of all 
kinds – length, mass, speed, temperature, electrical resistance, the cut, clarity and carat ratings of 
gemstones, etc. Measurement standards are among the oldest standards in the world, and have 
traditionally been developed by governmental actors seeking to facilitate trade and commerce both 
within and outside of their jurisdictions.4 Performance standards establish minimum criteria for a 
product, service, individual or organization – from automotive emissions to food storage to legal 
competency; standards like these are intended to achieve goals such as health and safety, 
environmental protection and public trust. As such, they have often been established by 
governmental actors, but also by trade and professional associations.   
 
Our focus is mostly on the third category – standards that are intended to promote the 
compatibility of products and services offered by different vendors. Government-sponsored efforts 
to standardize industrial components such as parts for firearms and railroad tracks have been 
documented since the late eighteenth century. 5  But large-scale movement toward the 
standardization of industrial components, which was largely a private sector phenomenon, did not 
occur until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Commercial pressure toward 
standardization arose from two related but distinct sources.  In the first, dominant entities such as 
the U.S. military, Ford Motor Co. and AT&T found it beneficial for their suppliers to produce 
parts that were standardized and interchangeable – features that enabled more efficient 
procurement and reduced production costs. The second emerged from a desire for greater 
international harmonization and cooperation among groups of engineers – the “international” 
standardization movement documented by JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy in their 
comprehensive history Engineering Rules.6 The earliest balance requirements of SDOs originate 
in this movement.  
 
A. EARLY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The earliest standardization organizations in Europe and the United States arose at the end of 
the 19th century from private sector initiatives.7 This early standardization movement was largely 
independent of government control. Lacking formal legal means of enforcing compliance with 
their standards, early advocates of international standardization saw the need to involve both the 
manufacturers of standardized goods and their customers in standardization, to ensure that 
standards responded to their respective interests.  As a result, when the International Association 
 
3 See, e.g., ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS 
17-18 (2014). 
4 See, e.g., STEVEN M. SPIVAK & F. CECIL BRENNER, STANDARDIZATION ESSENTIALS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 7-
11 (2001) (briefly noting historical examples); KEN ALDER, THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS: THE SEVEN-YEAR 
ODYSSEY AND HIDDEN ERROR THAT TRANSFORMED THE WORLD (2014) (history of the creation of the metric system 
of weights and measures during the 18th century). 
5 See SPIVAK & BRENNER, supra note 4, at 10-12. 
6 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1. 
7 For an overview of the historical development of international standardization, see id. 
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for Testing Materials (IATM) – the first international association created solely for setting 
voluntary industry standards – was created in 1898, it established a policy “that its Technical 
Committees should be nearly equally divided between producers and consumers.” 8  IATM’s 
policies created a widely observed precedent and influenced practices in international standards 
organizations, as well as national and regional organizations in the United States and Europe.9 We 
refer to these early SDO requirements to balance the interests of different groups, most notably 
producers and users of the standardized goods, as “traditional” balance requirements. 
 
One of the oldest international standards organization still in existence, the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), was formed in 1906.10  It appears that, at the founding 
conference of the IEC, debate arose as to membership, and delegates chose to expand beyond 
professional engineers to include representatives of manufacturers, in order to ensure the success 
of standardization efforts.11 The need for a balanced membership was therefore very much on 
the minds of the national professional electrical engineering associations as they created the IEC. 
 
B. BALANCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE WTO TBT AGREEMENT 
 
Despite their origins in international standardization, balance of interests requirements in 
standards development subsequently evolved at the national and regional levels (see Parts III and 
IV). One reason for this shift is that there are few regulatory instruments at international level 
capable of imposing procedural principles on SDOs. One exception is the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the “TBT Agreement”).12 The 
TBT Agreement largely mirrors the provisions of the 1979 Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
made under the previous Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).13  
Each TBT Agreement includes provisions designed to ensure that national standards will not be 
used as non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services.  Like the rest of the WTO Agreement 
resulting from the Uruguay Round, the TBT Agreement was adopted in 1994.  Unlike its 
predecessor, it included an annex titled “Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and 
Application of Standards”.14  
 
The Code of Good Practice focuses on aspects of standards development that are directly 
relevant to international trade. It does not provide for a balance of interests requirement or 
comparable process principles. In 2000, however, the Code was supplemented by a decision of the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade that governs the TBT  Agreement, which invites SDOs 
to adopt “procedures for soliciting input from a wide range of interests”, and notes that “Bodies 
operating with open, impartial and transparent procedures, that afford[] an opportunity for 
consensus among all interested parties” are more likely to develop effective standards that do not 
 
8 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting Proceedings of the ASTM 1, no. 7 (1900), p.76). 
9 See id. at 45 (“Similar membership policies would be adopted by other standardizing bodies subsequently, as 
would the policies around balance of producers and consumers of materials.”) 
10 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 66-67 
11 Id. at 69-71. 
12 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 120. 
13 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, 
14 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra, note 12, Annex 3 at p. 138. 
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create unnecessary obstacles to trade. 15  This decision emphasizes the impartiality of the 
standardization process and its openness to a wide range of interests, but does not require SDOs to 
balance representation of different interest categories.  
 
Additionally, in 1994 - concurrently with the negotiation of the WTO Code of Good Practice 
- the IEC and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) jointly developed their own 
“Code of good practice for standardization”, ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 (Guide 59). The membership 
of ISO and IEC includes the National Standards Bodies (NSB) of a large number of countries, and 
in many countries these bodies play a predominant role in standardization. Guide 59 may thus be 
seen as an attempt by private organizations to contribute to discussions taking place within the 
WTO by providing guidance on internationally respected standardization principles.  
 
In particular, Guide 59 stipulates that the standardization processes of NSBs and other 
standards organizations at the national level “should provide for balanced representation of interest 
categories such as producers, buyers, consumers, etc.” Similar balance requirements apply to 
NSBs representing the national interests in regional and international standardization. In a 2019 
revision to Guide 59, the requirement to balance representation of different interest categories is 
replaced with a less stringent requirement of “keeping an impartial and independent position by 
providing the opportunity for representation by an appropriate balance of interests”.  
 
The revised language brings the ISO Guide more closely in tune with the TBT Committee 
Decision of 2000 and its call for impartiality and openness to participation by a wide range of 
interests (as opposed to ensuring balanced representation of different categories).16 Furthermore, 
it appears to reflect experience with balance requirements from standardization practice. More 
detailed guidance by ISO to NSBs, also issued in 2019, states that “Quotas shall not be used, 
because it’s not possible to make general rules for stakeholder balance, due to diversity of technical 
sectors.”17 Through the interpretations of the TBT Committee Decision and the revised ISO/IEC 
 
15 Decision of the TBT Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and 
Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, Nov. 13, 2000, being Annex 4 to 
the Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
G/TBT/9.  
16  The intent to better align Guide 59 with WTO principles is stated in the foreword to the revised Guide: “The first 
edition of this document predated the existence of both the WTO TBT Committee decision on principles for the 
development of international standards, guides and recommendations (G/TBT/9, 13 November 2000) and the WTO 
TBT Agreement’s Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (Annex 3 of 
the 1995 WTO TBT agreement). The purpose of this edition of this document is to provide recommendations for 
implementing good standardization practices that are intended to support, but do not replace or supersede, the two 
WTO TBT Committee documents.” ISO/IEC Guide 59(2019), Foreword, at v. With the revision, a “scope” has also 
been added to Guide 59, stating that the Guide “provides recommended standardization practices that are intended 
to support the application” of the TBT Code of Good Practice and the TBT Committee Decision of 2000. 
17 ISO Guidance for ISO national standards bodies - Engaging stakeholders and building consensus, 2019; available 
at https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/store/en/PUB100269.pdf (last consulted on December 28, 2020). 
It is important to note that the guidance nonetheless does not abandon the principle of balanced representation: 
“Attempts should be made to achieve balance with respect to the composition of the NMC [National Mirror 
Committee]. Procedures should exist to safeguard against dominance by any stakeholder or stakeholder category”. 
“Working group (WG) convenors are also responsible for ensuring a balance of interest and representation of all 
relevant stakeholder categories in their WGs, and must issue a new call for experts in case of imbalance.” 
Furthermore, balance of interests should be assessed with respect to appropriately defined interest “categories”; at 
a minimum, SDO should consider the following categories and assess whether they have an interest in the standard: 
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Guide 59, the concept of balance of interests is thus linked to keeping the standardization process 
open to a variety of interests.  
 
Conversely, the notion of balance is included in authoritative international interpretations of 
“open standards”. For example, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an 
intergovernmental standards organization, defined “open standards” in 2005 in the context of 
discussions regarding Intellectual Property Rights. One element of this definition is that the 
standardization process should be “reasonably balanced” to ensure “that the process is not 
dominated by any one interest group.”18  
 
III. EVOLUTION OF SDO BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
A. EARLY SDO POLICIES – TRADITIONAL BALANCE REQUIREMENTS (PRE-1960) 
 
Several prominent standardization efforts in the United States during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were unilaterally undertaken by dominant organizations – the U.S. 
military, which standardized thousands of mechanical components during World War I, Ford 
Motor Co., which relied on standardized parts to enable the mass-production of automobiles, and 
AT&T, the telephone monopoly that standardized many aspects of the U.S. telecommunications 
infrastructure.19  Yet the need for standards also became apparent in industries that were not 
dominated by single players, but which required interconnection and compatibility among 
competitors’ products and services – railroads, agricultural tools, electrical equipment, and 
machinery of all kinds. Professional engineering societies emerged as loci for the development of 
such standards.  
 
Early on, these societies realized that standards development and adoption could be hampered 
by conflicts among different interest groups, such as producers and users of standardized 
products.20 In line with the example set by international organizations such as the IATM (and later 
 
Industry and commerce, government, consumers, labour, academic and research bodies, standards application (e.g. 
testing, certification, and accreditation bodies), and non-governmental organizations. This indicative list of interest 
categories (especially in conjunction with the examples provided for further illustration) is a clear representation of 
“societal balance”, as defined in Parts III and IV below. 
18 “Definition of Open Standards”, Definition developed by IPR Ad Hoc Group and endorsed by TSAG at its 
meeting on 11 November 2005, available at https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/open.aspx (last consulted on 
December 28, 2020). 
19 See Off. Tech. Assessment (OTA), Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future at 42-44, OTA-TCT-512, 
March 1992 [hereinafter OTA 1992 Report]; RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 97. 
20  For example, the development of standards for railway tracks was hampered by conflicts between railway 
companies, strongly represented in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and steel makers, which 
dominated the American Institute for Mining Engineers (AIME). Both organizations developed their own standards, 
reflecting the different companies’ preferences.  Over time, the organizations developed processes for taking into 
account both groups in order to produce successful standards. According to Yates and Murphy, “this focus on the 
needs of producer and consumer would become a hallmark of private standard setting.” YATES AND MURPHY, supra 
note 1, at 34. Another early field of standardization activities was electrical engineering. When the American 
Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE), formed in 1884, first engaged in standardization, “the point of greatest 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3806876
[Draft 18 Jan 2021] BALANCE Page 6 
the IEC), many early American standards organizations sought to balance the interests of 
manufacturers, users, and other interest groups.21  
 
While in many cases such balance was achieved informally by working group chairs and other 
SDO leaders, more formal institutional requirements soon emerged. Beginning in 1920, the 
American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC)22 – whose membership comprised AIEE, 
ASME, ASTM, and other leading SDOs of the time along with several US government agencies 
– required its Sectional Committees to maintain a balance of “producers, consumers, and general 
interests.”23According to historian Andrew Russell, “much more than a trivial bureaucratic detail, 
the mandate for balance between producers, consumers, and general interests was the foundational 
principle and essence of the enterprise.”24  
 
Over time, SDOs such as ASTM International adopted formal policies requiring that technical 
committees have minimum levels of representation from defined stakeholder categories (usually 
producers, “consumers”, i.e. users,25 and general interest).26 We refer to these numerical category 
balancing requirements as “quotas”. 
 
B. TOWARD A U.S. NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION POLICY (1960S-70S) 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was significant growth in legislation requiring 
environmental, health and safety standards in the U.S.  Between 1970 and 1972, the U.S. federal 
government created several agencies tasked with the development of regulatory standards, 
including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health 
 
contention was whether manufacturers should serve on the committee that would develop the standards. […] [AIEE 
president Francis] Crocker, however, took the more pragmatic view that ‘there are three sides to the question, […], 
the manufacturer, the purchaser and the consulting engineer, and leaving out any of them you do not necessarily 
produce any better result’. […] After some discussion, AIEE appointed a Committee on Standardization composed 
of men from all three of the constituencies.” Id. at 39. 
21 The American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) emerged from the American Section of the aforementioned 
IATM; but acquired institutional independence in 1902 in particular over concerns by the IATM that the American 
Section undermined the balance between producers and users required under IATM’s policies. By 1902, the new 
ASTM had overcome concerns by “users” (notably railway companies) that the new ASTM would unilaterally favor 
the interests of producers (steel makers), in great part by election of a president who represented a railroad 
(“consumer”) company. YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 50 
22 AESC was the precursor to today’s American National Standards Institute (ANSI). 
23 Annual Report of the American Engineering Standards Committee 8 (1920) (cited in RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 
71).  
24 Id. 
25 Early references to “producers and consumers” generally designate the opposing interests of two different groups 
of companies, namely the manufacturers and the industrial/commercial users of standardized goods, such as 
steelmakers and railways (e.g. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 54; YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 50). Reference to 
individual consumers is a much more recent phenomenon. 
26  ASTM Intl., Regulations Governing ASTM Technical Committees § 3.1.1 (2018) (defining “balance” as 
occurring “when the combined number of voting user, consumer, and general interest members equals or exceeds 
the number of voting producer members”) and § 3.2.1 (requiring that “Balance must be achieved before any 
standards are brought before a classified subcommittee or main committee for ballot”). See, also, Robert W. 
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting 
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1352-55 (1978) (observations of ASTM’s mandatory balance rules in 
practice).   
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Administration (OSHA). Facing increasing demand for standards with limited staff, agencies such 
as OSHA increasingly sought to adopt voluntary consensus standards developed by private 
SDOs.27  
 
At that time, industry-developed standards were subject to criticism by consumer advocates 
such as Ralph Nader, who contended that such standards were “essentially written by large 
corporations to exclude competitors from the marketplace, […] misrepresent hazardous products 
as safe, [and] boost sales while benefiting only the producer”. 28  Small businesses similarly 
complained that standardization processes were imbalanced and dominated by the interests of large 
corporations.29 In this context, both representatives of private standards organizations and their 
critics called for a national standardization policy that would safeguard all interests affected by 
proposed standards. 30  Some SDOs such as ASTM responded by providing funding for the 
representation of consumer interests in its committees.31  
 
In parallel, U.S. officials were pressing for inclusion of a Standards Code in the ongoing 
negotiations of the Tokyo Round of the GATT, further increasing the perceived need for a 
formalized U.S. standardization policy that could be used as a model in international 
negotiations.32  
 
During this period, there were several competing attempts to create a national standardization 
policy in the U.S. On one hand, some proposed policies aimed at significantly expanding 
government oversight of private standards development in order to accomplish several goals 
including the assurance of a balance of interests in standards setting processes. The proposed 
‘Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act’ aimed at creating a government-managed accreditation 
program for standard developers. In support of this accreditation program, the proposed bill 
provided that 
 
The Federal Trade Commission is directed to establish rules which will bring about 
uniform standards-development procedures assuring that the membership of standards-
development committees be balanced so as to include and to insure effective representation 
of all affected interests (e.g. consumers, small business concerns, users, manufacturers, 
 
27 OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 55.   
28  Ralph Nader, Testimony on the Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act, Hearings on S825, Before the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1st Sess. 1977 (cited in OTA 
1992 Report, supra note 27). 
29 In 1968, a select committee on small businesses of the House of Representatives issued a report, including a 
chapter on standardization. The chapter concludes that small business are typically underrepresented in the 
processing of voluntary industrial standards: “Sponsoring bodies are typically not subjected to any requirement as 
to the balance of their committees and subcommittees considering this standard. Often it would appear that small 
businesses, consumers, and other affected interests are not represented.” Final Report of the Select Committee on 
Small Businesses, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, pursuant to House Resolution 53, at 180. 
30 See William T. Cavanaugh, Needed: A National Standards Policy, 5 ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS, June 1977. 
31 Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1384. See Section III.C, infra. 
32 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 194-95. 
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suppliers, distributors, employees, environmental and conservation organizations, state and 
local procurement and code officials, labor, etc.).33  
 
In spite of being introduced in Congress in both 1975 and 1977, the bill never advanced past 
the committee stage.  
 
With legislative proposals stalled, there were other attempts to create tighter government 
oversight of private standardization. Prompted by individual grievances with specific voluntary 
standards, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated the procedures of voluntary 
consensus standardization more generally, and in 1978 issued a Proposed Rule and Staff Report 
finding that “standards development and certification activities have frequently caused or 
contributed to substantial consumer and competitive injuries.”34 For the authors of the FTC staff 
report, many of these concerns originated in insufficiently protective standardization processes: 
“Standards development and certification organizations have not adequately protected all of the 
interests affected by their activities. The procedures are capable of being, and have been, 
manipulated by large or established firms at the expense of consumers, small firms, new entrants, 
and others.”35  
 
In its analysis, the FTC distinguishes between two distinct violations of proper standardization 
process: ‘Dominant Firm Control’, in which a single firm or group of firms obtains an unfair 
advantage through a biased standardization process, and ‘General Industry Control’, in which 
“industry generally has greater influence in the development process than other groups, so 
standards may be aimed at furthering industry interests.”36  In the FTC’s view, existing SDO 
balance requirements were insufficient to remedy this situation: “Although competing interests 
purportedly receive balanced representation, certain interests are presumed to adequately represent 
other interests. For example, consumers have been presumed to be adequately represented by 
government officials, engineers, scientists, or academics” – a presumption that the FTC clearly 
believed to be erroneous.37   
 
To remedy these issues, the FTC’s 1978 staff report calls for new rules, which would treat the 
development of standards in violation of clearly defined standardization process principles as “an 
unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive act or practice” (i.e., behavior that the 
FTC has the authority to prosecute under Section 5 of the FTC Act).38 In particular, the report 
recommends that standards developers “provide to all persons equal opportunity to participate in 
all phases of all standards proceedings”.39 The FTC staff thus appears to approve of an approach 
to standards development rooted in openness, while not explicitly requiring balance and casting 
doubt on the effectiveness of formal “classification schemes” intended to mandate balance (e.g., 
 
33 S.B. 825 and H.R. 8184, 95th Cong. (Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act), Sec. 102(b)(1)(c). Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, Ninety-
Fifth Congress, First Session on S. 825, 1977.  
34 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standards and Certification – Proposed Rule and Staff Report 3 (1978) [hereinafter FTC 
1978 Report]. 
35 Id. at 5.  
36 Id. at 125. 
37 Id. at 128 
38 Id. at 289. 
39 Id. at 318. 
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the quota requirements imposed by ASTM). 40  Nevertheless, in cases in which unrestricted 
participation would become impractical, “the Standards developer may identify classes of persons 
with the same or similar interests in the proceeding and select a representative or representatives 
to exercise attendance and oral participation rights on behalf of each such class.”41 
 
The proposed Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act and the FTC’s 1978 Staff Report were 
strongly opposed by many industry representatives. Some standards organizations were 
particularly adamant in their criticism of what they perceived as government encroachment on 
their processes, with an ANSI representative complaining in a Senate hearing about the “misguided 
and crusading FTC staff”.42  In 1979, ANSI filed a lawsuit opposing adoption of the FTC’s 
proposed rules.43  
 
Other contemporary initiatives were significantly less intrusive, but nevertheless called for 
greater government scrutiny of the balance of interests in standards development. Administrative 
Conference of the United States (ACUS) Recommendation 78-4, adopted in 1978, focuses on the 
use of existing voluntary consensus standards in federal regulation, and calls on federal agencies 
to consider the “adequacy of the procedures followed by the organization preparing the standard 
to assure that: The membership of the technical committee represents a broadly based and balanced 
array of relevant interests, including, where appropriate, representatives of consumers, labor, small 
business, and other affected groups, and no single interest has a dominating influence on the 
committee”.44 
 
At the same time, other efforts encouraged greater government deference to the judgment of 
private SDOs regarding the appropriateness of standardization processes. This approach is 
exemplified by the 1979 Trade Agreements Act,45 under which the U.S. Congress approved the 
Tokyo Round of GATT, including its TBT Agreement.46  The Trade Agreements Act sets forth 
the principle that - unlike many other countries - the interest of the U.S. in ISO and other private 
international standards organizations should be represented by private sector organizations, but 
provides no specific guidance how this representation should be carried out.47  
 
40 Id. at 328 (“The concept of "balance" also may be perpetuated, as was observed above. The proposed rule does 
not require balance, on the assumption that it is costly and impractical, and that even "balanced" voting does not 
ensure a principled, nonharmful result. Never the less, within the confines of the written-comment and equal-
opportunity-of-participation requirements of S 457.5, the standards developer is free to run its committee and voting 
as before.”) . 
41 FTC Proposed Rule 457.5(c), Federal Register, Vol. 43, No. 236–Thursday, December 7, 1978 
42 Hearings before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
United States Senate 96th Congress First Session on Oversight to Examine the Enforcement and Administrative 
Authority of the FTC to Regulate Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. September 27, 1979, at 289. 
43  American National Standards Institute v. FTC, Civ. No. 79-1275 (D.D.C. 1979), filed May 9, 1979. 
44  Admin. Conf. U.S., Recommendation 78-4: Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard-Setting 
Organizations in Health and Safety Regulation, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1978 at 6 (1978) [hereinafter 
ACUS Recommendation]. According to Professor Emily Bremer, the initial OMB Circular was the culmination of 
a long interagency effort to codify the procurement practices of individual federal agencies (direct communication 
with Contreras). 
45 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96–39, 93 Stat. 144, July 26, 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. Ch. 13). 
46 Id. § 2503(a). 
47 Id. § 2543(b)(2). 
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C. BALANCE REQUIREMENTS AT ANSI (1960S-70S) 
 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), formed in 1916, serves as the accreditation 
body for SDOs that are developers of American National Standards.48  While ANSI accredits more 
than 200 individual SDOs, not all U.S.-based SDOs are ANSI-accredited (notable omissions 
including IETF and W3C), and only few foreign-based SDOs are accredited.49  
 
Concerns over the representation of consumers and other societal groups underlying the 
different regulatory and legislative efforts of the late 1970s were shared by ANSI and many ANSI-
accredited SDOs.50  In response, these SDOs implemented a variety of programs intended to 
increase the voice of consumers in standardization activities, ranging from informal “consumer 
sounding boards” to direct participation by technically qualified consumer representatives on SDO 
technical committees.51 In 1967, ANSI created a Consumer Council to review and comment upon 
standards affecting consumers prior to their approval. 52  Underwriters Laboratories created a 
similar council.53 
 
In addition to outreach to underrepresented groups, in 1974 ANSI significantly expanded its 
oversight of due process principles in the development of American National Standards when it 
first issued its Procedures for Management and Coordination of American National Standards.54  
Section 4.8.3 of the Procedures formulated explicit requirements to balance the composition of 
American National Standards committees among representatives of different interest groups. 
Notably, it distinguished between product and safety standards committees. Participants in product 
standards committees were classified as representing producer, retailer or user interests, as well as 
the general interest (any party having an interest other than those covered by the other categories). 
Safety standards committees were required to classify participants into a significantly larger set of 
interest categories, also including employers, employees, government and consumers, among 
others. In addition, the balance requirement for safety standards committees was more stringent: 
whereas in product standards committees, no category should have a majority; in safety standards 
committees, no interest category should have more than one third of the committee membership. 
This distinction suggests that an imbalance between industry and other interests (such as 
consumers and employees) was seen as less acceptable in the case of safety than product standards.  
 
 
48 Jorge L. Contreras, Origins of FRAND Licensing Commitments in the United States and Europe in CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 149, 162-63 (Jorge 
L. Contreras, ed., 2017). 
49 ANSI, ANSI Membership Roster, https://myaccount.ansi.org/Membership/membershipRoster.aspx (visited Jan. 
15, 2021). 
50 Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1383-86. 
51 Id. at 1384. 
52 Id. at 1385. The ANSI Consumer Interest Forum, which exists today, is the successor to the Consumer Council.  
See ANSI, Consumer Interest Forum (CIF), https://www.ansi.org/consumer_affairs/cic?menuid=5#overview.  
53 Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1385, n. 157. 
54 ANSI, Procedures for Management and Coordination of American National Standards (1974) [hereinafter ANSI 
Procedures (1974)]. Prior to this, Professor Hamilton observes that ANSI “made no systematic attempt to ensure 
compliance with [its] procedural requirements”). Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1346. 
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In order to enforce this balance requirement, each committee secretariat was required to submit 
an initial list of committee members to its standards management board for approval. The board’s 
approval of the committee composition would be based, among other criteria, on the fact “that, 
where applicable, substantial balance [as defined above] exists among voting representatives”.55 
A similar, albeit less specific, balance requirement also applies to other standards developers 
seeking ANSI accreditation: the rules specify that accreditation of standards organizations will be 
based on compliance with criteria including “Balanced membership on each standards committee 
among those interests having potential concern with the specific project.” 56  
 
These developments in private SDOs played a role in the public debate over the need for 
binding regulation regarding standardization. Writing in 1982, Professor Robert Hamilton 
observes that the reason OSHA initially encountered problems in the use of private standards was 
that it “uncritically accepted a large number of voluntary standards, some of which dated back fifty 
years or more”.57 The use of such legacy standards was problematic not only because they may 
have been technically outdated, but also because they were often developed using inadequate 
processes. As Hamilton notes, “[t]wenty years ago the [standardization] process was much more 
secretive and closed, and there was less emphasis on, and concern with, ‘balance’ and due 
process.”58  
 
This view is also reflected in testimony at the 1977 Senate hearings on the Voluntary Standards 
Accreditation Act.59 Few objected to the relevance of the proposed procedural principles, but many 
questioned the usefulness of a government accreditation program that would duplicate the effective 
procedures in place for enforcing due process through ANSI.60 
 
 
D. BALANCE AND OMB CIRCULAR A-119 (1976-80) 
 
In 1976, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed a draft policy 
in the form of a circular memorandum to the heads of executive agencies.61 The development of 
 
55 ANSI Procedures (1974), supra note 54. 
56 ANSI Procedures (1974), supra note 54. In 1977, a note was added to this section of the Procedures, specifying 
that “The spirit and intent of 4.8.3 Classification of Representatives shall be used as a criterion”.  ANSI, Procedures 
for Management and Coordination of American National Standards (1977). 
57 Robert W Hamilton, Prospects for the Nongovernmental Development of Regulatory Standards, 32 AM. U. L. 
REV. 455, 464 (1982). See also STEPHEN J. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 102 (1982) (citing “serious 
problems” with OSHA’s wholesale adoption of large numbers of industry standards, including the promulgation of 
standards that were antiquated and inapplicable). 
58 Hamilton, Prospects, supra note 57, at 465. 
59 VSAA Hearings, supra note 33. 
60 The Edison Electric Institute e.g. lamented that the bill would “destroy an established private sector organization 
that is performing these functions effectively”. VSAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 617. The American Petroleum 
Institute complained that “The effect of this bill would be to destroy the private sector American National Standards 
Institute which has successfully performed its role in the voluntary standardization system. ANSI would be 
supplanted by a government controlled "National Standards Management Board"”. Id. at 634. The National Society 
of Professional Engineers stated that “The Federal Government should avoid competition and duplication with 
ANSI”. Id. at 967.  
61 Off. Mgt. Budget, Federal Interaction with Commercial Standards-Setting Bodies – Proposed OMB Circular, 41 
Fed. Reg. 53723 (1976) [hereinafter OMB Circular Proposal 1976]. 
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this circular reflected the ongoing tension between permissive and interventionist tendencies in 
U.S. standardization policy. 62  The 1976 draft called for increased use of voluntary industry 
standards by government agencies.63 The reception of this circular by the private sector was largely 
favorable but at least two government agencies had negative comments. 64  A 1977 version 
attempted to account for concerns that were raised, notably by limiting government use of 
voluntary industry standards to those issued by government-accredited standards bodies.65 This 
version in turn was criticized by ANSI and other representatives of the private standardization 
system.66 Over the following years, an Interagency Committee on Standards Policy deliberated 
over these contentions,67 culminating in the release of the finalized policy as OMB Circular A-119 
in January 1980.68 
 
Circular A-119 establishes a Federal policy favoring the use of privately developed voluntary 
standards in federal procurement activities:  
 
It is the general policy of the Federal Government to … [r]ely on voluntary standards both 
domestic and international with respect to Federal procurement, whenever feasible and 
consistent with law and regulation pursuant to law;69 
 
For purposes of the 1980 Circular, “voluntary standards” are defined as standards that are 
 
established generally by private sector bodies and are available for use by any person or 
organization, private or governmental. The term includes what are commonly referred to 
as "industry standards" as well as "consensus standards" but does not include professional 
standards of personal, conduct, private standards of individual firms, or standards 
mandated by law,70 
 
And “voluntary standards bodies”, the groups that “develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary 
standards” are defined as 
 
nongovernmental bodies which are broadly based, multi-member, domestic and 
multinational organizations including, for example, non-profit organizations, industry 
associations, and professional technical societies.71   
 
In addition to adopting voluntary standards in their procurement functions, Circular A-119 
encouraged federal agencies to participate in voluntary standards bodies.72 Standards bodies in 
 
62 See, e.g., Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1438-39; ACUS Report, supra note 44, at 13.  
63 OMB Circular Proposal 1976, supra note 61.  
64 OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 55; Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1439-41. 
65  Off. Mgt. Budget, Proposed OMB Circular on Federal Interaction with Voluntary Consensus Standards-
Developing Bodies, 43 Fed. Reg. 48 (1977). 
66 OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 56; Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1441-44. 
67  Id. at 16 
68 Off. Mgt. Budget, Federal Participation In the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards; Final Issuance, 45 
Fed. Reg. 4326 (1980) [hereinafter OMB Circular A-119 (1980)]. 
69 OMB Circular A-119, supra note 68, at 4326 ¶ 5.a. 
70 Id. ¶ 4.c. 
71 Id. ¶ 4.e. 
72 Id. ¶ 6.b. 
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which federal agencies participated, however, were required to comply with certain minimum “due 
process” criteria.73  These included, among other things, a “balance” requirement described as: 
 
Inviting representatives of a broadly-based group of persons likely to have an interest in 
the subject including, for example, consumers; small business concerns; manufacturers; 
labor; suppliers; distributors; industrial, institutional and other users; environmental and 
conservation groups; and State and local procurement and code officials.74 
 
It is notable that this requirement of Circular A-119 places an emphasis on inviting 
representatives of all interested stakeholder groups to participate in standardization, rather than 
enforcing any particular mix or numerical quota of representatives from different stakeholder 
categories, on one hand, or simply opening standardization activities to those who are interested, 
on the other. 
 
E. THE REAGAN ERA: DEREGULATION AND FLEXIBILITY 
 
With the election of Ronald Reagan to the White House in 1980 and his Administration’s 
strong push toward deregulation of industry sectors from airlines to oil and gas,75 a permissive 
approach toward private industry standardization prevailed in the U.S. government’s 
standardization policy. In 1981, the President’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief reviewed OMB 
Circular A-119 to determine whether it imposed unnecessary burdens on the public or private 
sectors.76 Following this review, a draft revision of the Circular was published in the Federal 
Register on April 20, 1982.77 After a 60-day public comment period, during which 120 comments 
were received, a final revision was published on October 26, 1982.78 
 
The 1982 revision of the Circular introduced a number of substantive changes. Most 
importantly, it expanded the scope of the Circular from federal procurement activity to both federal 
procurement and regulatory activity. In addition, it eliminated the 1980 version’s enumerated “due 
process” requirements for federal participation in voluntary standards organizations.  In response 
to public comments objecting to this deletion, OMB responded that “the imposition of the 
mandatory procedures included in the previous editions of the Circular is inappropriate, 
burdensome and costly and … peripheral to the fundamental aims of the Circular”.79  The U.S. 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) supported the elimination of the “rigid” 1980 due 
process requirements, but urged federal participants in SDOs to foster transparency and “open 
standards proceedings” to “mitigate the substantial anticompetitive potential inherent in private 
 
73 Id. ¶ 6.c. See also Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1346 (applying the term “due process” broadly to a set of 
procedural protections). 
74 OMB Circular A-119 (1980), supra note 68, ¶ 6.c. 
75 See, generally, BREYER, supra note 57; Jefferson Decker, Deregulation, Reagan-Style, Regulatory Rev., Mar. 13, 
2019. 
76 cite 
77 47 Fed. Reg. 16,919 (1982). 
78 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496 (1982). 
79 Id. 
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standards groups”.80 In its 1982 version, “with the due process requirements eliminated, OMB 
Circular A-119 is strongly supported by the private sector”.81 
 
In line with the revisions of OMB Circular A-119, the FTC in 1983 issued a Final Staff Report 
on Standards and Certification, which marks significant changes from the FTC’s 1978 report.82 
The Final Staff Report continues to recognize that “the failure of a standards organization to 
provide procedural safeguards to those who may be adversely affected by its actions can constitute 
an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.”83 Nevertheless, the standard 
that it establishes for these procedural safeguards falls short of the 1978 Proposed Rule’s 
requirement that SDOs should offer all parties equal opportunity to participate at all stages of 
standards development. Rather, the FTC considers that SDOs must provide affected producers 
with notice, the opportunity to file a complaint to the SDO, and the right to a written response.84  
 
This standard does not protect a minimum representation of certain interest categories. In line 
with the 1978 Report, the Final Staff Report of 1983 reflects skepticism of some SDOs’ formal 
balance requirements.85 Echoing some of the concerns expressed in the 1970s,86 the FTC notes 
that quota schemes are seldom imposed on the working groups that actually formulate technical 
standards documents, the classification of individuals into particular categories is often imperfect, 
and there are ample other ways to skew the standardization process even when such requirements 
exist.87  
 
F. THE EVOLUTION OF SDO APPROACHES TO BALANCE (1980S) 
 
At the same time that the U.S. government adopted a significantly more lenient approach 
toward SDOs, ANSI fundamentally revised its processes. The 1983 version of ANSI’s Procedures 
for the Development and Coordination of National Standards takes a much more permissive 
approach to balance of interests than prior versions. The strict balance requirement included in the 
1974 and 1977 versions of the Procedures is replaced by an obligation to secure the 
‘Representation of Interests’: “All directly and materially affected interests shall have the 
opportunity for fair and equitable participation without dominance by any single interest”.88  
 
The previously mandatory provisions for balanced committee composition are referred to as 
“the historical criteria for balance”.89 The Procedures state that compliance with these ‘historical 
criteria’ would usually satisfy the mandatory requirement to avoid dominance by any single 
 
80 Letter dated June 22, 1982 from Ronald G. Carr, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to 
Donald E. Sowle, Admin. for Federal Procurement Policy, OMB (reproduced at 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496). 
81 OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 56 
82 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standards and Certification – Final Staff Report (1983) [hereinafter FTC 1983 Report]. 
83 Id. at 262. 
84 Id. at 273. 
85 Id. at 159 (“for several reasons, classification schemes do not always achieve their intended effect”). 
86 See  Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1354-55 (given the impossibility or impracticability of applying mandatory 
balance rules to working groups, the putative balance protection at ASTM may, in fact, be illusory). 
87 FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82, at 159-64. 
88 Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1983), at 4  
89 Id. 
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interest; nevertheless, such balanced composition is no longer systematically required or assessed 
by ANSI: “Unless it is claimed by a directly and materially affected interest that a single interest 
dominated the standards development process to the exclusion of fair and equitable consideration 
of other viewpoints, no test for dominance is required.”90 
  
The new version of the Procedures significantly weakens the requirement to seek balanced 
representation of different interest categories. It does not, however, abandon this requirement 
entirely, nor the underlying definition of balance as a situation where different interests are 
sufficiently equally represented. The listed “interests” make it clear that “interests” still refer to 
constituencies with aligned commercial interests in a standard, such as producers, users, etc. 
Absence of dominance by a single interest thus differs from domination of standards processes to 
the benefit of a single firm or single product, and refers to the absence of a situation in which a 
single constituency would hold “a position or exercise of dominant authority, leadership, or 
influence by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation.” The revised procedures also 
continue to distinguish between product and safety standards, where the criteria of balance are 
more stringent for the latter. 
 
ANSI’s procedures relating to balance again changed in 1987, when the name of the due 
process requirement in question was changed back to “Balance”: “The standards development 
process should have a balance of interests and shall not be dominated by any single interest 
category.”91 In addition to explicitly stating that standards development processes should reflect a 
balance of interests, the 1987 revision of the Procedures makes it more explicit that – in the context 
of balance – the absence of dominance clearly refers to dominance by an interest category, rather 
than dominance by a single actor or by a coordinated group of actors. Nevertheless, the 1987 
revision did not reinstate the rigid process for verifying balanced representation that was present 
in the 1970s. Balanced committee composition would “usually satisfy” the balance requirement; 
however, balance in committee composition should only be tested if a directly and materially 
affected party claimed that a single interest category dominated the standards development 
process. The provisions with respect to balance of interests were not significantly modified in the 
1993, 1997, and 1998 revisions of ANSI’s Procedures.92 
 
G. THE RISE OF CONSORTIA AND IT STANDARDIZATION (1980-90S) 
 
ANSI’s more flexible approach towards assessing balance of interests in the development of 
American National Standards may reflect the significant transformations in the standardization 
ecosystem that were under way in the 1980s. In the context of the ever-increasing role of 
information technology, alternative models for standardization – referred to broadly as consortia -
- emerged alongside, or even in explicit reaction to, more established SDOs. Consortia arose 
because many firms viewed existing SDOs and their processes as inadequate for the complex 
 
90 Id. 
91 Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1987). 
92 Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1993), Am. 
Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1997), Am. Natl. 
Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1998).  
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interoperability needs of new information and communication technologies.93 As two veteran 
standardization practitioners observe, “SDOs are, by their nature, inclusive groups. As such, they 
tend to be large, so their effectiveness diminishes. As the preferences of the group members 
becomes more diverse, it becomes more difficult to reach consensus.”94 Consortia may offer a 
simpler, yet unbalanced, alternative to more formal SDOs: “These must be small groups with a 
relatively uniform preference structure in order to be effective. Almost by definition, these must 
be exclusive groups”.95  
 
In addition to consortia driven by corporate members, the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) introduced a new type of standards organization with its own institutional norms. IETF 
arose in 1985 out of the U.S. government’s program to develop a resilient distributed computer 
network during the 1960s and 1970s. As such, the original developers of the protocols underlying 
that network were primarily from academia and government. The result of that program, the 
ARPANET, eventually evolved into the Internet that we know today, and IETF emerged as the 
principal global forum for the development of Internet standards.96 
 
IETF embodies a model in which technical work is open to meaningful and effective 
participation by all interested individuals. This included, at least in the IETF’s early days, a 
significant proportion of academic and government representatives. Competing attempts at 
developing standards for network connectivity were largely driven by corporate interests, e.g. the 
telecommunications network operators prominently represented in the Consultative Committee for 
International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT).97 CCITT worked within ISO to create the Open 
Systems Interconnection model (OSI). Backed by numerous governments (including the U.S., 
which at one point referenced its own OSI implementation, GOSIP, for public procurement),98 
OSI was a plausible contender to become the world standard for computer connectivity. OSI 
however was undermined by conflicts among different stakeholder constituencies (such as the 
“legacy” providers of proprietary network solutions, most notably IBM, and telecommunications 
network operators), which created significant challenges for the traditional, open and consensus-
oriented decision making processes. As historian Andrew Russell notes. 
 
Whereas OSI found the time-honored principles of democratic inclusivity to be both 
necessary and fatal, the Internet flourished by developing their network architecture within 
a well-funded and homogeneous environment that was, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
insulated from commercial and political pressures.99 
 
93 Martin Weiss & Carl Cargill, Consortia in the standards development process, 43 J. AM. SOCY. INFO. SCI. 559 
(1992); YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 255-56 (“in the late 1980s large information technology companies in 
the United States and elsewhere turned away from multi-stakeholder consensus-based standard-setting organizations 
and toward each other to address their standardization needs”). 
94 Weiss & Cargill, supra note 93, at 563. 
95 Id. As they grew in significance, some consortia gravitated closer to the established SDOs, and partly embraced 
their procedural principles. For instance, the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards 
(OASIS), a software-based consortium, sought and obtained ANSI accreditation. 
96 See, generally, YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 242-54. 
97 RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 179 (“The CCITT’s protocols were deliberately designed to put control of the network 
in the hands of the PTTs”). 
98 Andrew Russell. 'Rough consensus and running code' and the Internet-OSI standards war. IEEE ANNALS OF THE 
HISTORY OF COMPUTING 28.3 (2006), at 53. 
99 RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 258. 
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Consortia and the early IETF constituted formidable competitors to more formal SDOs, 
because they offered an unbureaucratic venue for homogeneous groups to make rapid progress on 
the development of technically viable standards. IETF’s seemingly “autocratic” governance 
structure (decisions were largely made by a centralized group of engineers) came under increasing 
criticism by its diverse participants, culminating in 1992 in a “constitutional crisis”, which initiated 
a new institutional model based more heavily on principles of openness (see below). 100 
Nevertheless, by that time, the Internet had already emerged victorious over its rival OSI, with 
IETF as its primary venue for standards development. 
 
These consortia models thus competed with traditional SDOs, which had to become more 
flexible in order to remain viable. At the same time, closed standardization processes were at odds 
with the societal concerns that had led to the formalization of due process principles for 
standardization in the 1970s. Even though the explicit reference to these due process principles 
was eliminated from OMB Circular in 1982, the early IETF and the numerous consortia emerging 
in the 1980s seemingly fell outside the Circular’s definition of “voluntary standards body”. In 
practice, while federal regulations incorporate standards issued by a large number of non-
governmental organizations, including some consortia, these standards still predominantly 
originate from ANSI-accredited ASDs, formal international SDOs, and other well-established 
organizations. 
 
H. THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST LAW ON BALANCE REQUIREMENTS:  HYDROLEVEL AND ALLIED 
TUBE (1980S) 
 
Industrial collusion in the context of standard setting has been observed for many years. For 
example, in 1962, the Department of Justice secured criminal indictments against the Johns-
Manville Corporation and several of its employees for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act for 
bringing about the adoption by ASTM and another SDO “specifications designed to increase the 
costs of foreign-made asbestos-cement pipe and couplings, to render such products ineligible for 
use, and to otherwise restrict and eliminate competition from such foreign-made products.”101 Yet 
ASTM itself was exonerated from the charges and the judge later spoke glowingly of “the balance 
of interests represented on ASTM committees and … the detailed and scrupulously observed 
procedure which governs their operation”.102 
 
But by the 1980s, the procedures and processes of SDOs themselves began to come under 
judicial scrutiny when coupled with allegedly anticompetitive behavior by SDO participants. Two 
of the most important cases of this type were American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
v. Hydrolevel,103 and Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.104 Each case involved 
 
100 Id. at 256. 
101 Application of American Soc. for Testing & Materials, 231 F. Supp. 686, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
102 Spivak & Brenner, supra note 4, at 38 (quoting unreported judicial findings of fact). 
103 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
104 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
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antitrust claims that challenged the procedures used within SDOs and helped to shape the modern 
understanding of “due process” requirements within the standardization context.105 
 
ASME involved a standard for boilers and pressure vessels promulgated by a committee of 
ASME, an ANSI-accredited SDO.  Hydrolevel marketed a boiler safety device that competed with 
devices marketed by the industry leader, McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M).  In response to the 
loss of a large customer to Hydrolevel, two employee of M&M affiliated companies, who also 
served as the chair and vice-chair of the relevant ASME subcommittee, issued a statement on 
ASME letterhead that the type of device manufactured by Hydrolevel provided “no positive 
assurance” that ASME’s safety standards would be met.  M&M employees then distributed this 
letter to potential customers, implying that Hydrolevel’s device was unsafe and causing Hydrolevel 
to lose significant business.  When Hydrolevel discovered that M&M was behind the ASME letter, 
it sued M&M and ASME for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits 
conspiracies in restraint of trade.  
 
Hydrolevel settled its claims against M&M, but ASME refused to settle, taking the position 
that it should not be held responsible for the anticompetitive conduct of its participants.  The 
Supreme Court decided the case in 1982, holding not only that ASME was liable for the conduct 
of the M&M employees acting in their capacities as ASME officers, but affirming an award of 
treble damages against the SDO. The ASME decision established that SDOs can be liable for 
antitrust violations committed by their participants, and underscored the need for SDOs to adopt 
processes that mitigate the potential for anticompetitive outcomes.106 
 
The implications of this principle for SDO balance requirements were subsequently clarified 
in the Supreme Court’s Allied Tube decision. The SDO in question was the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA), a large organization formed in 1896 to develop standards for fire 
safety equipment and systems. At the time, NFPA had approximately 30,000 members drawn from 
state and local governments, educational institutions, professional associations, manufacturers and 
users of fire-fighting equipment, and fire insurance companies.107 In addition to fire codes, NFPA 
is also responsible for the National Electrical Code, which establishes requirements for the design 
and installation of electrical wiring systems, many of which are adopted into local building codes 
and regulations.108  The facts of the controversy that ensued at NFPA, which are reproduced in 
detail below for illustrative purposes, are as follows:109 
 
 
105 Legal regimes, and antitrust law in particular, have strongly shaped SDO practices and procedures.  See JRC 
Report, supra note 2, at x. 
106 ASME, 456 U.S. at 573 (“Only ASME can take systematic steps to make improper conduct on the part of all its 
agents unlikely, and the possibility of civil liability will inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME to take those 
steps. Thus, a rule that imposes liability on the standard-setting organization – which is best situated to prevent 
antitrust violations through the abuse of its reputation – is most faithful to the congressional intent that the private 
right of action deter antitrust violations.”). 
107 Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1340 (“Manufacturers constitute about six and one-half percent and insurance 
companies eleven percent of NFPA's membership”). 
108 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-96. 
109 The facts underlying the famous Allied Tube case are but one of several controversies involving NFPA and its 
procedures during the 1980s.  See FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82, at 162-63 (citing additional complaints that 
NFPA’s “procedural rules governing standards development were exploited to thwart participation”). 
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Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical conduit, the hollow tubing 
used as a raceway to carry electrical wires through the walls and floors of buildings. 
Throughout the relevant period, the Code permitted using electrical conduit made of steel, 
and almost all conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, [Indian Head, Inc. 
(IHI)] began to offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride… 
 
[IHI] initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride conduit as an approved type of 
electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the Code. Following approval by one of the 
Association's professional panels, this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 1980 
annual meeting, where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the members 
present. Alarmed that, if approved, [IHI’s] product might pose a competitive threat to steel 
conduit, [Allied Tube], the Nation's largest producer of steel conduit, met to plan strategy 
with, among others, members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and 
its independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude [IHI’s] product from the 
1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new Association members 
whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl chloride proposal. 
 
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the Association and to attend 
the annual meeting to vote against the proposal. [Allied Tube] alone recruited 155 persons 
-- including employees, executives, sales agents, the agents' employees, employees from 
two divisions that did not sell electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director. 
[Allied Tube] and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 for the membership, 
registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the annual meeting, the steel group 
voters were instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by group leaders who used 
walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate communication. Few of the steel group voters 
had any of the technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of them 
spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to approve polyvinyl 
chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in opposition, the proposal was rejected 
and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to 390.110 
 
Shortly after this vote, IHI brought suit against Allied Tube and other steel conduit 
manufacturers alleging that they had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by unreasonably 
restraining trade in the electrical conduit market. After a jury trial, a verdict was entered against 
Allied Tube and its co-defendants.111 But the verdict was nullified by the district court n.o.v. under 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 112  and it was this issue that was eventually appealed to the 
Supreme Court in 1988 (IHI won on this point as well – the jury verdict against Allied Tube was 
reinstated).113  
 
110 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 496-97. 
111 Id. at 498. 
112 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961); United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965).  The so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that “where a 
restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, those 
urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint.” 
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136. 
113 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-10 (“we hold that, at least where, as here, an economically interested party exercises 
decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market 
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But it is not the Noerr issue for which the Allied Tube case is remembered today. Rather, it is 
the Court’s dicta approving the jury’s finding of antitrust liability against Allied Tube and the other 
steel conduit manufacturers. Specifically, the Court recognizes that the “hope of procompetitive 
benefits [from standard-setting] depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the 
standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining 
competition.” 114 It goes on to observe that “[w]hat [SDO members] may not do (without exposing 
itself to possible antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the [standard-setting] process by, as 
in this case, stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic 
interest in restraining competition.” 115  Thus, the Court recognized that an SDO member’s attempt 
to stack the deck to defeat a particular proposal or to gain some other economic advantage in 
standard-setting could be enough to result in a violation of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the 
Court conceptualized its vision of a properly-functioning standardization system as one that is 
“nonpartisan”.116 
 
I. 1990S – 2000S: THE NTTAA, THE 1998 REVISIONS TO OMB CIRCULAR A-119, AND 
ANSI’S ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
In 1992, four years after the Allied Tube decision, OMB issued a new request for comments 
regarding Circular A-119. In response, several commenters suggested that the definitions in 
Circular A-119 were “ambiguous” and recommended changing them to reflect either the Supreme 
Court’s approach in Allied Tube or the definitions in the GATT Standards Code.  OMB declined 
to change the definitions in the Circular, noting that they “are not being misinterpreted and have 
served their purpose well”.117  A final revised version of the Circular was issued on October 26, 
1993. It did not require that SDOs adopt specific balancing of interests or other due process 
principles.118 
 
In 1996, President Clinton signed the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act 
(NTTAA).119 Among other things, the NTTAA embodied in statutory language the OMB Circular 
A-119 requirement that federal agencies “use technical standards that are developed or adopted by 
voluntary consensus standards bodies.”120 Because the term “voluntary consensus standards body” 
was not expressly defined in the NTTAA, it was generally understood to refer to the definition 
contained in the Circular. 
 
The enactment of the NTTAA thus led to another review of the Circular, and on December 27, 
1996, OMB released a new draft version for public comment.121 Public hearings were held on 
 
participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard 
has of its own force in the marketplace.”) 
114 Id. at 509. 
115 Id. at 511. 
116 Id. at 506-07. 
117 58 Fed. Reg. 57,643 (1993). 
118 Id. 
119 Pub. Law 104-113 (1996). 
120 Id. at  § 12(d)(1). 
121 61 Fed. Reg. 68,312 (1996) 
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February 10, 1997 and comments were received from over 50 sources.  OMB published the final 
revisions to the Circular on February 19, 1998.122 
 
The 1998 revisions of the Circular constitute a complete overhaul of the structure and language 
of the Circular, converting it to a “plain English” question-and-answer format. It substantially 
altered the definition of “voluntary consensus standards body” from prior versions of the Circular.  
The new definition reads as follows: 
 
A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by the following attributes: 
 
(i) Openness. 
(ii) Balance of interest. 
(iii) Due process. 
(iv) An appeals process. 
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, 
and includes a process for attempting to resolve objections by interested parties …”123 
 
This definition differs significantly from the definition of “voluntary standards body” 
contained in each prior version of Circular A-119. Whereas earlier definitions simply referred to 
organizations that “develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary standards”, the 1998 definition 
imposes a new set of criteria defining such bodies, including openness, balance of interest, and 
due process. It is possible that the Supreme Court’s decision in Allied Tube influenced OMB in 
developing this new set of criteria for SDOs, particularly a formal requirement of “balance” (which 
would conceivably prevent the type of deck-stacking attempted by Allied and its co-conspirators). 
But other than “consensus” none of the new terms (including “balance of interest”) was defined in 
the 1998 version of the Circular.124  
 
J. THE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2004 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the standardization world witnessed a wave of litigation 
involving allegations of deception involving patents by companies including, most notably, 
Rambus, Inc.125 Among other things, Rambus was the subject of an investigation and prosecution 
by the FTC, which accused it of violating  both the Sherman Act and the FTC Act. These antitrust 
actions caused SDOs around the world to revisit their intellectual property policies and to consider 
their potential liability in such disputes.126 One of the outgrowths of this heightened awareness 
was the enactment in 2004 of the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act 
 
122 63 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (1998). 
123 63 Fed. Reg. 8,554, § 4.a(1). 
124 Several commenters in 1997 requested that OMB clarify these definitions, but OMB declined to do so. 63 Fed. 
Reg. 8,548, Item 28. 
125  See, generally, Renata B. Hesse & Frances Marshall, U.S. Antitrust Aspects of FRAND Disputes in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 263, 
272-74 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). 
126 See JRC Report, supra note 2, at 140. 
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(SDOAA),127  which was intended to offer SDOs protection against certain types of antitrust 
liability that could arise from the actions of their members. 
 
Rather than craft a new legislative framework for this protection, Congress simply added SDOs 
to the types of entities already protected under the existing National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA),128 which itself was an outgrowth of the Reagan-era National 
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA). 129  When enacted the NCRA was intended to 
encourage innovation and promote trade by facilitating the participation of U.S. industries in R&D 
joint ventures.130 To achieve this goal, the NCRA offered two principal antitrust protections to 
qualifying “joint research and development ventures” – an immunity from treble damages under 
the antitrust laws131 and a requirement that the conduct of joint R&D by such entities be evaluated 
under the antitrust “rule of reason” and not be subject to per se liability.132 In 1993, given pressures 
on U.S. manufacturing industries, the protections of the NCRA were extended to joint production 
ventures.133  
 
Under the original NCRA, “joint research and development ventures” are defined as “two or 
more persons” engaged in one of a variety of enumerated technical cooperation activities, and 
which did not engage in any of a list of prohibited anticompetitive activities.134 This definitional 
structure was preserved in the NCRPA. 135  Under the SDOAA, “standards development 
organizations” were added to the types of entities protected by the Act. It defines “standards 
development organization” as “a domestic or international organization that plans, develops, 
establishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards using procedures that incorporate the 
attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and consensus in a 
manner consistent with the Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A–119, as revised 
February 10, 1998.” 136 Like the 1998 circular, the SDO balance requirement under the SDOAA is 
not defined. 
 
However, the preamble to the SDOAA elaborates on the due process requirements of OMB 
Circular A-119, noting in particular that the “balance” requirement provides for “balancing 
interests so that standards development activities are not dominated by any single group of 
interested persons.” 137 This “non-domination” balance requirement, which must be read into the 
text of the SDOAA, is distinctly not a quota requirement.  That is, the SDOAA does not mandate 
 
127 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Public Law 108–237 (2004), codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306. 
128 National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Public Law 103–42 (Jun. 10, 1993), codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. 
129 Public Law 98-462 (Oct. 11, 1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. § 4. 
132 Id. § 3. 
133 NCRPA, supra note 128. 
134 NCRA, supra note 129, § 2(6). 
135 NCRPA, supra note 128. 
136 Id. § 103(1)(8). Interestingly, the SDOAA (both at the time of its enactment and today) expressly incorporates 
the 1998 version of OMB Circular A-119 into its definition of “standards development organization”. Thus, it is not 
clear that definitions from subsequent versions of the Circular (e.g., the 2016 version, discussed below) are actually 
incorporated into the SDOAA. 
137 Id. § 102(5)(C). 
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that SDOs ensure that all or every conceivable interest group be represented in SDO decision 
making, but only that SDO deliberations are not “dominated” by any single group. This non-
domination requirement echoes the cautionary language of the Supreme Court in Allied Tube, 
which warned against “stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing 
their economic interest in restraining competition.”138 
 
K. BALANCE AND THE ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS  
ANSI’s Procedures document was superseded in 2003 by a new document titled Due Process 
Requirements for American National Standards, better known as the ANSI Essential 
Requirements. At a high level, the ANSI Essential Requirements echo the “due process” 
requirements of OMB Circular A-119. Thus, they provide that a developer of American National 
Standards must operate according to principles of openness, lack of dominance, balance, consensus 
and appeals.139 In terms of balance, however, ANSI adopted a semi-structured approach falling 
somewhere between the rigid quota requirements of ASTM and the unstructured requirements of 
Circular A-119 and the SDOAA. 
 
Section 1.3 of the Essential Requirements, which establishes at the outset that “The standards 
development process should have a balance of interests”, imposes the following affirmative 
requirements on accredited SDOs: 
 
Participants from diverse interest categories shall be sought with the objective of achieving 
balance. If a consensus body lacks balance in accordance with the historical criteria for 
balance, and no specific alternative formulation of balance was approved by the ANSI 
Executive Standards Council, outreach to achieve balance shall be undertaken.140 
 
The “historical criteria” referred to above are set out in Section 2.3 which provides: 
 
Historically the criteria for balance are that a) no single interest category constitutes more 
than one-third of the membership of a consensus body dealing with safety-related standards 
or b) no single interest category constitutes a majority of the membership of a consensus 
body dealing with other than safety-related standards. 
 
In defining an “interest category”, ANSI notes that such categories may vary from case to case, 
being “a function of the nature of the standards being developed”. Though not strictly required, 
three interest categories are suggested: producer, user141 and general interest. However, the door 
is left open “where appropriate” for the consideration of additional interest categories including 
consumer, directly affected public, distributor and retailer, industrial/commercial, insurance, labor, 
manufacturer, professional society, regulatory agency, testing laboratory, and trade association.142 
 
138 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 511.  
139 Am. Natl. Standards Inst., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National 
Standards 4 (2019) [hereinafter ANSI Essential Requirements (2019)]. 
140 Id. 
141 Four different sub-categories of “user” are defined based on the type of standard being produced: consumer, 
industrial, government and labor. Id. 
142 ANSI’s non-exhaustive list of potential interest categories does not include firms seeking to monetize patents or 
foreign manufacturers. 
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The ANSI Essential Requirements impose an affirmative duty on accredited SDOs to seek 
participants from diverse interest categories, and that if balance does not exist, the SDO must 
undertake outreach to achieve that balance. As the ANSI Executive Standards Council clarified in 
2016, “outreach to achieve balance in accordance with a developer’s accredited procedures is a 
requirement.” 143   Such outreach must be targeted to any “specific interest categories is not 
sufficiently populated on an [SDO] consensus body”, and may include: “specific website 
solicitations, webinars, meeting announcements with specific recruitment of identified interest 
categories sought, social media postings, targeted solicitations in meeting agendas and reports, 
trade press, publications, direct E-mails/mailings, press releases, articles, phone calls (document 
them) and soliciting recommendations from consensus body members.”144 
 
In addition to these outreach requirements, the ANSI Essential Requirements include a separate 
non-domination requirement: 
 
The standards development process shall not be dominated by any single interest category, 
individual or organization. Dominance means a position or exercise of dominant authority, 
leadership, or influence by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation to the 
exclusion of fair and equitable consideration of other viewpoints.145 
 
ANSI clearly considers balance and lack of dominance to be distinct considerations.146 As its 
Executive Standards Council explains: 
 
The existence of a balanced consensus body does not preclude the exercise of dominance. 
Similarly, the existence of a less than perfectly balanced consensus body does not 
necessarily reflect a process in which dominance automatically occurs. 147 
 
Accordingly, ANSI requires both affirmative outreach activity to ensure balance, and a final 
group composition that avoids dominance by any single interest category.  
  
L. THE 2016 REVISION OF OMB CIRCULAR A-119 AND BEYOND 
In 2012, OMB again invited public commentary on Circular A-119.148 After releasing a draft 
revision in 2014, OMB published the final revised version of Circular A-119 in January 2016.149 
It includes the following provision: 
 
 
143 ANSI, Guidance on “Balance” and Outreach within the American National Standards (ANS) Process (ExSC 
042_2016) at ¶ 3.0 [hereinafter ANSI Balance Guidance]. When assessing whether an SDO has complied with this 
requirement, ANSI “may request related evidence that demonstrates the type of outreach undertaken by a developer 
to achieve balance”. 
144 Id. ¶ 4. 
145 ANSI Essential Requirements (2019), supra note 139, at § 1.2. 
146 ANSI Balance Guidance, supra note 143, ¶ 6. 
147 Id. 
148 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 (2012). 
149 81 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (2016), referencing Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-119: Federal 
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment 
Activities, Jan. 22, 2016 [OMB Circular A-119 (2016)]. 
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Balance: The standards development process should be balanced. Specifically, there should 
be meaningful involvement from a broad range of parties, with no single interest 
dominating the decision-making.150 
 
The 2016 version of the Circular encourages “meaningful involvement” not from all affected 
stakeholder groups, but from “a broad range” of parties. This requirement avoids formal quota 
language, as it does not specify that SDO decision making bodies should be composed of particular 
proportions of different stakeholder groups. Rather, the balance to be attained appears more 
flexible. In its responses to comments on the definition of balance, the OMB stated that it intended 
its definition of balance to be “consistent” with ANSI’s Essential Requirements, and to “allow for 
flexibility in how balance is determined during the consensus phase of the development or 
adoption of the standard.”151 
 
In addition, the Circular echoes the “non-domination” language of the 2004 SDOAA. It 
prohibits any “single interest from dominating the decision-making.” This being said, the 2016 
version of the Circular introduces a new element to the balance calculation: the differing interests 
of holders of intellectual property rights (IPR) and implementers of a standard.  While this 
distinction is not mentioned in the section of the Circular that discusses balance, it appears in the 
immediately preceding paragraph, which defines “voluntary consensus standard”: 
 
In order to qualify as a “voluntary consensus standard” for the purposes of this Circular, a 
standard that includes patented technology needs to be governed by such policies, which 
should be easily accessible, set out clear rules governing the disclosure and licensing of the 
relevant intellectual property, and take into account the interests of all stakeholders, 
including the IPR holders and those seeking to implement the standard.152 
 
The inclusion of IPR holders in this seeming invocation of balance principles would become 
important in the years immediately following the publication of the 2016 Circular, as discussed in 
Part N, below. 
 
M. PRACTICAL BALANCE 
One model of standards development that emerged from the computing industry in the 1980s 
eschews any formal requirement to balance stakeholder interests, and instead relies on the 
openness of the standardization process to ensure that all interested parties have an opportunity to 
participate.153  This emphasis on openness is coupled with monitoring and informal intervention 
by the group’s leadership “to ensure that no one group holds an overwhelming edge that might 
influence adversely the fairness of the standards produced.”154 
 
150 OMB Circular A-119 (2016), supra note 149, at § 2(e)(ii). 
151 OMB Circular A-119 (2016), Supplementary Material, Discussion and Responses to Significant Comments, at 
7. 
152 OMB Circular A-119 (2016), supra note 149, at § 2(d). 
153  See CARL F. CARGILL, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDIZATION : THEORY, PROCESS, AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 99, 109 (1989) (“working groups … are composed of volunteers representing all facets of the 
affected industry – the providers, the users, government, academia, interested or involved groups, and individual 
experts”). 
154 CARGILL, supra note 153, at 108. 
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Despite the potential benefit of qualifying as a “voluntary consensus standards body” under 
OMB Circular A-119 and the SDOAA, and as a developer of American National Standards, some 
SDOs in this camp have steadfastly refused to adopt any formal balance requirements in their rules 
and policies. The most notable of these holdouts is the IETF,155  which in 1992 moved to a 
governance model emphasizing its openness to all interested parties,156 but which does not impose 
any formal requirements of balance on its deliberations. 157  The IETF explained in its 2012 
comments to OMB its belief that a balance requirement “is largely duplicative of the "openness" 
and "due process" prongs of the definition [of voluntary consensus standards body]”.158 It further 
noted that IETF is widely acknowledged by both federal agencies and academic commentators to 
be an exceptionally open and democratic body.159 As such, IETF contends that it achieves a high 
degree of balance through the mechanism of openness – what may be termed “practical balance”. 
This approach, while not achieving the degree of numerical balancing that could be achieved under 
a quota or more formal balancing system, has resulted in a long-standing and effective 
standardization process.  Moreover, this approach does appear to enable the participation of diverse 
interest groups in IETF standardization projects when potential standardization activity impacts 
issues of public concern, such as privacy and government surveillance.160   
 
IETF has reinforced its interpretation of “balance” in the stated principles of the OpenStand 
initiative, which also includes the IEEE Standards Association and W3C.  There, “Balance” is 
included as one of the five principles shaping the “modern paradigm for standards” and is defined 
for this purpose as having standards activities that “are not exclusively dominated by any particular 
person, company or interest group.”161 As such, the IETF (and IEEE-SA and W3C) seem to 
embrace a “non-domination” interpretation of balance, rather than a more prescriptive formula for 
including certain interest groups. 
 
Moreover, even without formal balance requirements, some SDOs have taken positive steps to 
encourage participation by diverse stakeholder groups including consumers and civil society.162 
 
155 IETF has, by choice, never sought accreditation by ANSI. 
156  See Letter dated Apr. 29, 2012 from Jorge L. Contreras, Russ Housley and Bernard Aboba to Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, at 2 [hereinafter IETF Letter] (“The IETF 
is completely open to newcomers, and has no membership fee or other membership requirements.”) See also YATES 
& MURPHY, supra note 1, at 253-54 
157 See YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 253-54. There are some exceptions to this general principle at IETF. One 
exception regards the composition of Nominating Committees (NomComs), whose ten members are randomly 
selected from a pool of qualifying volunteers. If the random selection results in more than two appointees with the 
same affiliation being selected, the third such candidate is replaced with another candidate randomly selected from 
the pool. 
158 IETF Letter, supra note 156, at 4.   
159 Id. 
160  See ALISON HARCOURT, GEORGE CHRISTOU, SEAMUS SIMPSON, GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING IN INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE 160-61 (2020) (integration of consumer interest groups into IETF discussion of government 
surveillance of Internet traffic) and 182-83 (involvement of Center for Democracy and Technology and other citizen 
groups in IETF data privacy discussions); John B. Morris, Jr., Injecting the Public Interest into Internet Standards 
in OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY 3, 9-10 (Laura DeNardis, ed., 2011) 
(discussing examples of engagement by public interest/policy advocates in IETF standard setting). 
161 OpenStand, Principles, https://open-stand.org/about-us/principles/ (visited Sep. 17, 2020). 
162 See JRC Report, supra note 2, at 120.  
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IETF, through its parent organization the Internet Society, regularly funds the participation in IETF 
standardization activities of individuals from developing countries.163  
 
 
N. BALANCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES 
In 2015, IEEE amended its patent policy164  in a manner that was argued by some to be 
unfavorable to IEEE participants that primarily sought to earn revenue from the licensing of 
patents covering IEEE standards (“patent-centric” firms) and overly favorable to participants that 
primarily sought to earn revenue from sales of standardized products (“product-centric” firms).165 
As such, both the IEEE policy and the decision making process that led to its adoption, were 
criticized as being unbalanced. The ensuing public debate over the IEEE policy involved multiple 
SDO participants, SDOs and the U.S. DOJ.  
 
On February 2, 2015, the DOJ issued a Business Review Letter, which recognizes that an 
unbalanced process for setting an IPR Policy may potentially violate antitrust laws. 166  
Nevertheless, after reviewing the process through which the update was adopted, the letter 
concludes that “Given the numerous opportunities for comment, discussion, and voting at different 
levels within IEEE, the Department cannot conclude that the process raises antitrust concerns”.167 
To reach this conclusion, the DOJ relied on the ability of all stakeholders to make comments, 
approval of the policy by majorities and supermajorities in different governance bodies, and the 
“fiduciary” duty of members of these bodies towards the IEEE; but did not further discuss patent-
centric firms’ concerns with the composition of these governance bodies. 
 
Under the Trump Administration, DOJ officials gave numerous speeches emphasizing a more 
stringent interpretation of balance requirements for SDOs under antitrust laws, in particular with 
respect to the balance between the interests of patent- and product-centric firms.168 In 2018, the 
DOJ, in reviewing a proposed ANSI policy change regarding the review of letters of assurance 
from accredited SDOs, reminded ANSI that “the Antitrust Division will ... be skeptical of rules 
that SSOs impose that appear designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage from IP creators 
 
163 See Jorge L. Contreras, National Disparities and Standards-Essential Patents: Considerations for India in 
COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND COMPETITION ISSUES  
(Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Deviah & Indranath Gupta, eds., Springer: 2017). Since 2012, there has also been 
an increased focus within IETF on representation of women in leadership positions. Nevertheless, diversity among 
individual SDO participants along demographic lines needs to be distinguished from balanced representation of 
different stakeholder interest categories. 
164 For a discussion of these amendments, see JRC Report, supra note 2, at 151-64. 
165 E.g. J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON 
INNOVATION 301 (2016); Nicolo Zingales & Olia Kanevskaia, The IEEE-SA patent policy update under the lens of 
EU competition law, 12 EUR. COMPETITION J.195 (2016). For the distinction between patent- and product-centric 
firms, see Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical 
Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 206-07 (2013) (introducing terminology). 
166 “If a standards-setting process is biased in favor of one set of interests, there is a danger of anticompetitive effects 
and antitrust liability.” Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Michael 
A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015). 
167 Id. 
168  See e.g. speeches by Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim on November 10, 2017 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download and March 16, 2018 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download.  
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to implementers, or vice versa.” 169  The DOJ then called upon ANSI to “promote balanced 
representation in decisional bodies so that diverse interests are represented and SDO decisions do 
not shift bargaining leverage in favor of one set of economic interests, including the interests of 
either implementers or patent holders.”170 The DOJ again reminded ANSI of the importance of 
balance in a 2020 review of the 2015 U.S. Standards Strategy published by ANSI, writing that 
 
principles of openness and balance of interests should extend to intellectual property policy 
development. If an SSO’s intellectual property rights policy is too restrictive for one side 
or the other, it also risks deterring participation in procompetitive standard setting. The 
Department has urged ANSI to have balanced representation in its decisional bodies that 
are charged with implementing and revising ANSI’s Patent Policy, so that diverse interests 
are represented, and so that their decisions do not shift bargaining leverage in favor of one 
set of economic interests, including the interests of either implementers or patent holders.171 
 
In 2019, the DOJ expressed “significant concerns” that the GSM Association and its operator 
members “used an unbalanced standard-setting process, with procedures that stacked the deck in 
their favor, to promulgate [a standard] with self-dealing provisions designed to enhance or 
maintain the incumbent operators’ competitive position by entrenching network locking practices 
and otherwise deterring potentially disruptive competition.”172  
 
In 2020, the DOJ updated its 2015 business review letter to IEEE,173 citing both the IPR-related 
language of the 2016 version of OMB Circular A-119 as well as concerns raised in 2015 “that the 
IEEE's process for adopting the Policy was not balanced.”174 The DOJ emphasized that “[b]alance 
is … important not only to encourage participation and competition among patent holders in the 
standard-setting process, but also to ensure more significant antitrust concerns do not arise.” 175 It 
concluded by encouraging IEEE to consider whether further changes to its IPR policy might be 
warranted in order to address “the need for an open, balanced, and transparent process for standards 
development.”176 
 
The repeated emphasis by the DOJ on the need to take into account the interests of both patent- 
and product-centric firms when making SDO policy decisions on IPR indicates that IPR-related 
concerns were the primary focus of the Trump Administration’s interest in SDOs balance 
requirements.  The implications of this shift are discussed in greater detail in Part V, below. 
 
169 Letter from Andrew Finch, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y General, Antitrust Div. to Patricia Griffin, Vice 
President and General Counsel, Am. Nat'l Standards Inst. at 1 (Mar. 7, 2018) [DOJ ANSI Letter]. 
170 Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General to Sophia A. Muirhead at 10 n.53 (Sep. 10, 2020) 
[hereinafter DOJ IEEE Update Letter] (referencing DOJ letters to ANSI). 
171 U.S. Dept. Justice Antitrust Division, Comments on the U.S. Standards Strategy at 3 (September 8, 2020). 
172 Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General to Timothy Cornell, Esq. re. GSMA Business Review 
Letter Request at 4 (Nov. 27, 2019) [DOJ GSMA Letter]. 
173 Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015). 
174 DOJ IEEE Update Letter, supra note 170, at 10-11. 
175 Id. at 11. 
176 Id. at 9-10. 
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IV. BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 
 
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
As in the U.S., standardization in Europe has its origins in the standardization “movement” of 
the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Most early European standardization bodies arose from 
engineering associations. Electrical engineers, in particular, formed national associations in the 
leading European countries at the end of the 19th century.177 These associations ventured into 
standardization in the early 20th century. The British Standards Institute (BSI) was founded in 
1901, making it the oldest National Standards Body (NSB) in the world.178  In Germany, the 
Normenausschuß der deutschen Industrie (NADI, "Standardization Committee of German 
Industry") was created in 1917 in the context of World War I and the mobilization of German 
industry in support of the war effort.179 This is the precursor organization to today’s Deutsches 
Institut für Normung, or 'DIN', the German NSB. Other European NSBs or their precursor 
organizations were created early in the 20th Century, such as the French Association française de 
normalisation, or ‘AFNOR’, in 1926.180 
 
The activities of the European NSBs are also firmly rooted in the development of international 
standards. In fact, AFNOR was specifically created in 1926 in the context of the creation of the 
International Federation of the National Standardizing Associations (ISA) in order to allow for 
French representation in this international standardization organization. The founder of BSI, 
Charles Le Maistre, “has some claim to be known as the father of international standardization”,181 
and was prominently involved in the formation and leadership of both ISA and the IEC. Given the 
prominent role of international standards for the European NSBs, it is not surprising that the 
European NSBs were built on similar procedural principles as the international organizations and 
as their counterparts in the U.S.  
 
The importance of a balance of interests in representation in standards development, one of the 
most prominent standardization principles at the international standards organizations of the time, 
was similarly recognized by the early European NSBs and their individual leadership. 182 There 
were however limited formal requirements imposed on private standards development. BSI was 
first offered a Royal Charter in 1929, but this document does not stipulate specific standardization 
processes or principles. In Germany and other European countries, there was no formal 
 
177 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
178 Id. at 52. 
179  GÜNTHER LUXBACHER. DIN VON 1917 BIS 2019 – NORMUNG ZWISCHEN KONSENS UND KONKURRENZ IM 
INTERESSE DER TECHNISCH-WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG 48-61 (2020). 
180 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1,  at 86. 
181 JACK LATIMER, FRIENDSHIP AMONG EQUALS: RECOLLECTIONS FROM ISO’S FIRST FIFTY YEARS 16 (1997). 
182 YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 79, indicate that the main mover behind the creation of DIN, Waldermar 
Hellmich, believed very strongly in the need to involve all stakeholder (Interessengruppen) in standardization 
proceedings, in order to ensure both the quality and the legitimacy of the resulting standard.  
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governmental standardization policy at the time. Nevertheless, NSBs such as Germany’s DIN 
already saw a need to strengthen the legitimacy of their norms, and formulated general 
standardization principles. The preamble of DIN’s 1928 ‘standardization principles’ formulated a 
general balance requirement: “Standards must not be imposed from above, but have to be the result 
of collaborative efforts and agreement of all participants among producers, merchants, consumers, 
public authorities and science”183.   
 
 
B. NATIONAL STANDARDS BODIES: GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND FORMAL 
STANDARDIZATION PRINCIPLES   
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, private standards development in Europe was increasingly 
criticized as overly responsive to industry interests at the expense of other societal groups and 
concerns.184 At the same time, technology standards became increasingly important not only for 
industry, but also for regulation. In this context, in many countries in Europe governments 
perceived the need for a more formal standardization policy. This standardization policy generally 
entailed a formal government recognition of a private sector NSB as the country’s primary 
developer of national standards and representative in international standardization. In return, these 
policies stipulated standardization process principles – with different degrees of stringency and 
specificity – that aimed at ensuring better representation of dispersed and traditionally under-
represented societal interests (most notably consumers, but also labor, government, science, and – 
later – environmental groups).  
 
There were two options for the form of this standardization policy. Countries such as Austria, 
Belgium, and France chose legislation, whereas Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK instead 
opted for an agreement between the government and the NSB.  
 
The Staatsvertrag, the 1975 treaty setting out the agreement between DIN and the German 
government exemplifies a flexible approach to standardization policy. 185  The explanations 
accompanying the treaty recognize that standardization is a form of industry self-regulation (thus 
implicitly recognizing not only the absence of rigid government oversight of standardization 
practices, but also the dominant role of industry in standards development).186 The treaty offers 
financial support for standards development and formal recognition of DIN as German NSB, but 
excludes any delegation of governmental authority to DIN. In exchange for this recognition, DIN 
commits to pursue the public interest in standards development. The explanations appended to the 
treaty state that the pursuit of the public interest encompasses the development of standards 
 
183  “Normen dürfen nicht am grünen Tisch entstehen, sondern müssen aus gemeinschaftlicher Arbeit und 
Übereinkunft aller Beteiligten der Erzeuger, Händler und Verbraucher der Behörden und der Wissenschaft 
hervorgehen.”  LUXBACHER. supra note 179, at 88. Luxbacher highlights that at that time, similar to the English 
“consumer”, the German word “Verbraucher” did not designate individual end users, but industrial and commercial 
users of industrial goods, such as the railways. Id. at 84.  
184 See e.g. re. Germany LUXBACHER. supra note 179, at 353-55.  
185 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vertreten durch den Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, und dem 
DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V., vertreten durch dessen Präsidenten, 1975. 
186 Erläuterungen zum Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem DIN Deutsches Institut für 
Normung e. V., 1975. 
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relevant to environmental protection, health and safety, and consumer protection.187 In terms of 
representation, DIN is held to pursue the public interest by involving the relevant government 
authorities in its standardization processes. 
 
The treaty makes no mention of a balance of interests between different constituencies or 
private stakeholder groups within DIN. It does however commit DIN to abide by the 
standardization principles defined in DIN Standard 820-1 (Grundsätze der Normungsarbeit), 
which describes high-level principles of standards development, (version of 1974), and requires 
DIN to respect the stipulations of the treaty when revising this document. This version of DIN 
820-1 was adopted after several years of negotiations between DIN and the government, and led 
to a significant formalization in DIN’s requirements for standardization processes.188  
 
The revised DIN standardization principles state that the constitution of standardization 
committees should follow the principle that the different interests are represented in reasonable 
proportion to each other (in einem angemessenen Verhältnis zueinander). 189  The document 
provides a long, but non-exhaustive list of interests to be considered, such as users, government 
authorities, universities and colleges, commerce, crafts, insurance, industrial manufacturers, 
testing institutes, and others. Over time, this list has been expanded to include further interests to 
be considered, such as environmental groups.  
 
DIN documents also include balance requirements for different aspects of DIN’s work. Section 
3.3. of the DIN bylaws (Satzung) states that the composition of DIN’s presiding board (Präsidium) 
should be balanced between different interest groups. The ‘Directive for Standardization 
Committees’ (Richtlinie für Normenausschüsse) describes the process for creating a 
standardization committee; including a requirement to invite representatives of all interests to 
participate. There are no specific quotas for the representation of different interests, but there is a 
rule that the committee chair and vice-chair should represent different interests. 
 
In spite of the formal requirement to balance the representation of different interests, there is 
ample evidence that even after 1975 the interests listed by DIN 820-1 are not equally represented 
in DIN standardization committees. 190  In a parliamentary inquiry of 2019, three Bundestag 
representatives admonished a stark over-representation of industry in a DIN standardization 
 
187 Id.  
188 According to Luxbacher, the German Federal Ministry of Economics presented DIN with a choice between a 
revision of DIN 820-1 that would better protect the representation of consumer interests, or a reinforced government 
regulation of standardization. DIN chose the former. LUXBACHER, supra note 179, at 412. Böttger on the other hand 
describes the revisions to DIN 820-1 not as changes, but as a formal consecration of DIN’s long-held standards 
development principles. He argues that these principles were previously not sufficiently known to the public, leading 
to unfounded suspicions, in particular of a one-sided representation of particular interests. L. Böttger, Ursachen und 
Wirkungen des Vertrages zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem DIN Deutsches Normungsinstitut e.V 
In DIN DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR NORMUNG E.V. (HRSG.), TECHNISCHE NORMUNG UND RECHT 31-42 (1979)  (cited 
in Helmut Voelzkow, Private Regierungen in der Techniksteuerung: eine sozialwissenschaftliche Analyse der 
technischen Normung (1996)). 
189 The previous version from 1950 makes no reference to a balance of interests or equivalent or related procedural 
principles. 
190 VOELZKOW, supra note 188, at 230. 
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committee in the field of construction.191 In its response, the Federal government stated that by its 
treaty with the government, DIN is held to the principle of balanced representation of different 
interests required by DIN 820-1. Nevertheless, it is DIN’s prerogative to select the members of 
standardization committees, and committee composition is only subject to DIN’s internal appeals 
processes, not government oversight. As criticized by the inquiring representatives, the effect of 
this remedy is weakened by the fact that the public does not have access to the names of individual 
committee members.  
 
Balanced representation of different interests in standardization committees has, however, 
been recognized by German courts as critical to the public acceptability of standards. In a 1987 
decision involving a standard for traffic noise, the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) simultaneously identified the balancing of conflicting interests as 
critical to the development of a standard, while casting doubt on the possibility that such balancing 
could legitimately be done without the intervention of governmental authority.192 In 1984, the 
Federal Administrative Court held that a standard for children’s beds in hospitals could not be 
expected to be in conformity with the generally recognized state of the art because the relevant 
Technical Committee had failed to hear the technical experts from hospitals.193 Imbalance in the 
composition of a technical committee could thus result in a standard losing legitimacy and 
authority as representation of the technical state of the art. 
 
UK standardization policy has taken a trajectory similar to the German one. BSI is recognized 
as the NSB of the UK through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between BSI and the 
government. Similar to the German Staatsvertrag, the BIS MoU grants formal government 
recognition and financial support to BSI, and BSI commits to pursue the public interest, involve 
relevant government authorities, and uphold certain process principles in its standards 
development activities. Unlike the Staatsvertrag, Section 8.3 of the MoU explicitly provides for a 
balance of interests requirement:  
 
BSI will seek a fair and acceptable balance of all relevant interests in its work and will 
encourage their full participation in producing British Standards and in formulating the UK 
 
191 Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 19/7292 19. Wahlperiode 22.01.2019; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die 
Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Alexander Müller, Frank Sitta, Grigorios Aggelidis, weiterer Abgeordneter und 
der Fraktion der FDP 
192 “The Technical Committees of DIN are composed in such a way that the necessary technical expertise is at their 
disposal. Their members, however, additionally include persons representing the interests of certain branches and 
undertakings. Once cannot, therefore, understand the results of their consultations uncritically as solidified expertise 
(“geronnener Sachverstand”) or as pure scientific results. On the one hand, one cannot deny that DIN standards are 
drafted with expertise and a sense of public responsibility. On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that 
DIN standards are agreements between interested parties that have the aim to influence the market mechanism. 
Therefore, the Technical Committees of DIN do not meet the requirements which one must set as regards neutrality 
and objectivity of expert witnesses. Special caution with technical standards is needed, where their contents cannot 
be classified as extra-legal technical matters (“außerrrechtliche Fachfragen”), but, rather, entail the balancing of 
contradicting interests, which would need a democratically legitimised political decision in the form of a formal law 
or regulation." Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 22 May 1987, BVerwGE 77, 285-295 (291). Cited from and translation 
by HARM SCHEPEL & JOSEF FALKE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARDISATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EC AND 
EFTA. VOL. 1 (2000). 
193 Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 31 January 1984, Betriebs-Berater 1984, 563 (cited in SCHEPEL & FALKE, supra note 
192, at 133. 
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positions on proposed European and international standards which not only reflect sound 
and modern technical practice but also take fully into account the commercial needs of both 
manufacturers and users. […] 
 
BSI thus commits to seek (but not necessarily to achieve) a certain level of balance between 
all relevant interests. While the MoU does not offer a direct definition or examples of “all relevant 
interests”, it later focuses on the commercial needs of “both manufacturers and users” (a reference 
to the historical interest categories of standards development underpinning the traditional notion 
of balance of interests). 
 
The MoU references BSI’s “standard for standards” document BS-0 for more specific 
standardization principles. The version history of this document dates back to March 1974. It thus 
appears that BSI has formalized the principles on which its standardization processes are based at 
a very similar time as DIN and ANSI. BS-0 (cited in its latest version of 2016) lists balance of 
interests among the defining characteristic of British Standards: “development by balanced and 
broadly representative standing committees that retain responsibility for them indefinitely, and that 
reach agreement by consensus”. The most explicit reference to balance is made in Section 7.1, 
describing the principles of BSI committee work: “BSI has a responsibility to maintain a fair and 
comprehensive balance of interests within each committee. The nature of the balance necessarily 
varies from committee to committee, but a committee in which one type of interest has a 
predominant influence is likely to be regarded as unbalanced. There are areas of work for which it 
is difficult to achieve representation from a wide range of interest groups. In these cases it is 
important that representation on a committee is not limited to a single interest. As a general rule, 
there should be active participation by at least two parties whose interests do not coincide.” 
 
In addition to being required by the MoU, balanced representation of interests on BSI 
committees has been seen as critical for the acceptability of BSI standards, including by courts. 
An earlier version of BS-0 states:  
 
The quality of standards and their acceptance, particularly by the courts, depends largely 
upon the widest and most authoritative representation available. Any imbalance in the 
constitution of committees could result in the production of an inadequate standard which, 
if discredited by a court decision, might jeopardise the status of standards generally.194 
 
Other European NSBs have similar balance of interest requirements for their activities. In Italy, 
“UNI's Articles of Association provide that each Technical Committee should include an expert 
appointed by the competent administration and that an adequate balance be arranged between 
producers and purchasers in the composition of each Technical Committee.”195 This policy thus 
appears to provide for a balance of interests requirement along the traditional definition of interest 
groups in standards development.  
 
 
194 SCHEPEL & FALKE, supra note 192, at 107. 
195 Id. at x. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3806876
[Draft 18 Jan 2021] BALANCE Page 34 
In France, however, the ministerial order of 16 June 2009 on standardization policy casts a 
wider net: it provides that AFNOR will involve all stakeholders in its activities, including 
specifically consumer associations, trade unions and SME representatives, as well as academics.196 
 
 
C. EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION POLICY: FROM THE “NEW APPROACH” TO REGULATION 
1025/2012  
Similar to the NSBs in individual European countries, the European Standards Organizations 
(ESO) originated in the private industrial sector and gradually acquired formal recognition by 
different European institutions. The cooperation between the European Commission and the ESOs 
CEN and CENELEC was handled through “gentlemen’s agreements” until 1979, when CEN and 
CENELEC approached the European Commission for formal recognition by the European 
Economic Communities (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).  
 
The ensuing negotiations took place in the context of a significant transfer of standardization 
activities from the national to the European level. In its ruling in Cassis de Dijon and in subsequent 
case-law, the the Court of Justice of the European Union held that, in the absence of EU-level 
harmonization, a Member State cannot prevent the importation and marketing of a product that 
has been lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State, unless that first Member State 
can invoke a higher public-interest objective. 197 In standardization terms, the CJEU held that free 
movement of goods under EU law implies mutual recognition of national standards, where they 
pursue equivalent objectives. Accordingly, the Cassis de Dijon line of case-law gave a strong 
impetus to pursue standardization at the EU level, in order to build trust amongst Member States 
and remove impediments to trade.  
 
The current EU standardization policy was born in the early 1980s. As with many EU economic 
policies, it must accordingly be seen through the prism of the internal market. Standardization is a 
means to achieve the internal market. Furthermore it is also a means to ensure the success of EU 
industry, both internally (by enabling firms to reach a higher scale within the EU) and externally 
(by riding on EU standards to improve their competitive position abroad).  
 
Efforts to establish harmonization and mutual recognition of technical standards resulted in a 
Council Directive in March 1983,198 and the ‘New Approach’ to Standardization in 1985, 199 both 
of which became building blocks in the large-scale integration project of the Single European Act 
in 1986. Pursuant to the New Approach, instead of pursuing the harmonization of standards across 
the EU via direct legislation, the EU would issue general legislation setting out the essential 
requirements that must be complied with and mandate the detailed standardization work to 
 
196 Ministerial Order (Décret) 2009-697 of 16 June 2009 on standardization, JORF no 138:6 of 17 June 2009, art. 8 
and 14.  
197  CJEU, Judgment of 20 February 1979, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649. 
198 Directive 83/189 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and 
regulations [1983] OJ L 109/8. 
199 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards [1985] OJ C 
136/1. 
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ESOs.200 In this context, the ESOs CEN and CENELEC became increasingly important, as did the 
harmonization of the standards development processes of their members, the NSBs of different 
European countries. 
 
The negotiations between CEN, CENELEC, the European Commission, and EFTA resulted in 
an agreement of recognition in 1984, the ‘Memorandum No 4, General guidelines for cooperation 
between the [European Commission] and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the 
European standards institutions’.  As part of the Memorandum, CEN and CENELEC committed 
to allow for the representation of representatives of different interests: “In order to establish the 
grounds for a large recognition of the importance of European Standards, CEN and CENELEC 
will ensure that the interested circles, especially public authorities, manufacturers, users, 
consumers, trade unions, can, if they so wish, be effectively associated in the drawing-up of 
European Standards: the Commission will, should the case arise, help in the definition of the 
appropriate modalities”. This requirement thus constitutes “balance as openness”, in the sense that 
CEN and CENELEC are not required to remedy an imbalance in the representation of different 
interests that may arise from different degrees to which ‘interested circles’ are willing or attuned 
to participate in standards development. Indeed at the time national standardization organisations 
were seen as the main vehicle for the involvement of these interests.201 The list of interests to be 
considered is a mix of traditional (users, manufacturers) and societal (consumers, trade unions) 
interest categories.  
  
This Memorandum was subsequently referenced in the Council Resolution of 1985 
establishing the ‘New Approach’ to European standardization.202 In the annexes to the Resolution, 
the Council emphasizes the significance of the balance requirement set out in the Memorandum 
by extending its application to any other body other than CEN/CENELEC that might be entrusted 
with the development of harmonized European standards.203  
 
One such body is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the third ESO, 
which was created in 1988. The creation of ETSI occurred after the New Approach. It is the direct 
consequence of the liberalization drive in European telecommunications, which began with a 1987 
Green Paper issued by the European Commission.204 In the 1987 Green Paper, the European 
Commission recognized the strategic significance of quick and efficient standardization in order 
to open up the European telecommunications market, modernize the industry and catch up with 
the U.S. and Japan.205 Standardization efforts were hampered by the need to coordinate between 
the IT industry, which worked through NSBs within the CEN/CENELEC structure, and the 
telecommunications sector, where standardization was carried out by the state monopoly 
providers, acting through the Conférence européenne des postes et télécommunications (CEPT). 
 
200 Id. 
201 See Council Resolution of 4 November 1988 on the improvement of consumer involvement in standardization 
[1988] OJ C 293/1. 
202 See, note 199, supra.  
203 Council Resolution 1988, supra note 201, at 6. 
204  European Commission, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the 
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment COM(1987)290 (30 June 1987) [1987 Green 
Paper].  
205 This was the time when a group of operators and manufacturers, known as the Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM), 
was completing work on a new and promising European standard for 2nd-generation mobile communications. 
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In addition, since the Commission was proposing to separate the regulatory and operational 
functions of the state and monopoly providers on the way to liberalizing the market, the CEPT 
approach was no longer sustainable.206 The rationale for the creation of ETSI is encapsulated in a 
few sentences: 
 
[CEPT and CEN/CENELEC] have to continue to work on the basis of non-industrial 
working methods, based on working group meetings and part-time availability of [public-
sector] experts. Co-ordination with industry which is now indispensable, has been 
strengthened, but is still not on a permanent working level […] It is now time to consider 
[…] the best way to establish industrial working methods based on permanent teams, 
including an increased contribution by industrial and user experts […] The only efficient 
solution for creating a permanent basis will be the establishment of a stable physical centre. 
Such a European Telecommunications Standards Institute could provide the permanent 
core functions on which the acceleration of standards work can be based.207 
 
In line with the European Commission proposal, ETSI breaks with the model of 
CEN/CENELEC, in favor of direct involvement of stakeholders. From the very start, the EU 
institutions wanted ETSI to regroup manufacturers and operators. Accordingly, companies and 
other stakeholders can acquire individual membership in ETSI, and participate directly in many 
ETSI processes. ETSI’s Directives and Rules of Procedures (RoP) divide individual members into 
specifically defined categories: “Administrations; Other Governmental Bodies; National 
Standards Organizations; Network Operators; Manufacturers; Users; Service Providers; Research 
Bodies; Universities; Consultancy Companies/Partnerships; Others.” These categories are used to 
support certain (limited) clauses in support of a balance between these different interest groups; 
e.g. the chair and vice-chair of the General Assembly should not be representatives of the same 
category (RoP 4.3), “The General Assembly may decide to allocate a number of reserved seats on 
the Board to ensure representation of specific membership categories (e.g. User, SME).” (Rules of 
Operation, para. 2), and “Composition of the Finance Committee … as well as duration of the 
tenure of its members shall be fixed by the General Assembly in order to allow, with a minimum 
size, for fair representation of the various categories of ETSI members.” (Art. 2.1. of the Financial 
Regulations). For the purposes of determining membership dues and voting rights, members of 
certain categories (Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), University, User Association, Trade 
Association) are also grouped into the lowest class of membership, whereas the dues and voting 
rights of members in other categories are calculated as a function of the company’s annual 
turnover. These rules thus provide for some minimal balance between different categories, while 
at the same time vesting the bulk of the decision-making power with the largest companies among 
ETSI’s membership.  
 
 
206 Within CEPT, state monopoly providers were represented as national telecommunications administrations, in 
charge of regulation and service provision. The Green Paper proposed to turn CEPT into the association for the 
regulatory elements of the State monopoly providers, to the exclusion of the newly-separated operational firms (that 
would go on to form ETNO). Keeping standardization within CEPT would have kept service providers out of the 
loop. 
207 1987 Green Paper, supra note 204 at 112-113. 
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The European Commission pushed for a centralized European standardization system in its 
1990 Green Paper on European Standardization.208 Without a doubt, the overarching goal of this 
policymaking round was to increase the efficiency of standardization in the EU by reforming 
standardization processes and shifting the center of gravity away from NSBs towards ESOs. If that 
were to occur, however, the ESOs would need to strengthen the representation of non-industrial 
interests in their midst, in order to ensure that European-level standardization is accountable and 
legitimate. Indeed at the time CEN and CENELEC relied on NSBs to achieve that representation 
at a national level, and ETSI comprised mostly industry members.209 While the Commission 
proposals for greater centralization were rejected,210 that policymaking cycle nevertheless resulted 
in an agreement on a set of principles for ESOs, including transparency, openness, consensus, 
independence of vested interests and efficiency.211 ESOs were also urged to work more closely 
with “economic and social partners”, including SMEs. 
 
In the Report that opened the subsequent policymaking round at the turn of the 21st century, 
the Commission remained concerned primarily with the efficiency of European standardization, 
but it also emphasized accountability, in keeping with the ongoing debates on governance in the 
European Union after the Maastricht Treaty. 212  The Commission set out its definition of 
accountability, which builds on the principles listed in the previous paragraph, as they emerged 
from the previous policy cycle. There was no mention of balance as such, but nonetheless the 
statements made reflect a concern for both traditional and societal balance. Accountability 
requires, among others, that a “standard is supported by all major interested parties”, that 
“European-based interest groups [have access] to policy setting activities” and that “all interested 
parties [can] participate effectively in standardization work, under fair conditions”.213  
 
When it comes to specific recommendations for improvement, the Commission is concerned 
with societal balance first and foremost, requesting that CEN and CENELEC include European-
based workers, consumers, environmental and industry representatives in “strategic discussions 
and the elaboration of policy”.214  Accountability is used in the analysis as a distinctive feature that 
separates ESOs and NSBs from private consortia, that in the eyes of the Commission operate 
efficiently but lack legitimacy and accountability.215  
 
The European Parliament 216  and the Council 217  both endorsed the Commission policy 
proposals. In particular, the Council in its Resolution set the aim of a “high degree of acceptability 
as a result of the full involvement of all relevant interested parties in the standardisation process”. 
 
208  European Commission, Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization : Action for Faster 
Technological Integration in Europe COM(90)456 (8 October 1990).  
209 Id. at 35. 
210 The Commission found no support amongst stakeholders: see the summary of the round of consultations in the 
Commission Communication on standardization in the European economy [1992] OJ C 96/2.  
211 Council Resolution of 18 June 1992 on the role of European standardization in the European economy [1992] 
OJ C 173/1. 
212 Commission Report on efficiency and accountability in European standardization under the New Approach 
COM(1998)291 (13 May 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Commission Report]. 
213 Id. at 4. 
214 Id. at 10. 
215 Id. at 5. 
216 European Parliament, Resolution of 12 February 1999 [1999] OJ C 150/624. 
217 Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on the role of standardization in Europe [2000] OJ C 141/1. 
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It invited “the European standards bodies to develop or improve existing mechanisms, 
supplementing consensus at national level, allowing them to give broad consideration to the 
positions expressed by the various interest groups during the standardisation process” and stressed 
“that interested parties such as workers, consumers, and environmental interest groups should be 
fully involved in the standardization process at all relevant stages” Perhaps more clearly than the 
Commission in its Report, the Council did not dwell on the traditional notion of balance as parity 
between the representation or influence of different commercial stakeholder groups. Rather, it 
emphasizes the role of societal balance, and in particular adequate representation of potentially 
under-represented interests. 
 
One notable offspring of the 1999 Council Resolution was a Commission paper exploring the 
interplay between the European principles set out above and the principles found at international 
level in WTO law.218 There, the Commission noted that the WTO principles and the European 
principles are largely similar, yet it added that “it is important… to balance the interests not only 
of industry, but also consumer concerns, health and safety considerations, environment aspects 
and concerns of… SMEs”. 219  The traditional notion of balance is once more explicitly 
supplemented by societal balance, to which the Commission invites the WTO (and by the same 
token international SDOs) to give greater weight. The Council approved the Commission analysis 
in a subsequent set of conclusions.220 
 
The European emphasis on societal balance is also reflected in the current version of the CEN 
CENELEC Guide 4 of 2003 on the ‘Cooperation between CEN, CENELEC and ETSI and the 
European Commission and the European Free Trade Association’ (the successor of Memorandum 
4 signed in 1984). The paragraph on balance of interests now reads as follows: 
 
For their part, the European Commission and EFTA expect the European Standards 
Organizations CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to:  
[…] 
Ensure that structures and procedures allow for the highest possible degree of openness, 
transparency and representativeness. Procedures should be transparent and ensure 
independence from vested interests. Further efforts should be made to increase the 
participation of interested circles, especially public authorities, manufacturers, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, consumers, workers and environmental interest groups, at the 
national and European level in the drafting of standards and other deliverables and in 
ensuring their views are adequately taken into account. 
 
From 1984 to 2003, there were thus some noteworthy changes. First, the list of interests has 
changed: while “users” were removed as a group, SMEs and environmental interest groups were 
added, and trade unions replaced by “workers”. Replacing the traditional interest category “users” 
with societal groups such as SMEs and environmental interest groups is indicative of the 
transformation of the underlying notion of balance. In addition, the European Commission and 
 
218  Commission Staff Working Paper on European Policy Principles on International Standardisation 
SEC(2001)1296 (26 July 2001). This Paper followed a request from Council in its 1999 Resolution, ibid. The WTO 
principles are found in the decision of 10 November 2000 taken under the TBT Agreement, WTO/G/TBT/9. 
219 Staff Working Paper, id, at 4, 8.  
220 Council Conclusions of 1 March 2002 on standardisation [2002] OJ C 66/1. 
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EFTA expect increasingly proactive steps from CEN and CENELEC to achieve greater societal 
balance. While the earlier version of the agreement merely required the ESOs to “ensure that 
[different interest groups] can, if they so wish, effectively be associated”, the version of 2003 states 
that “Further efforts should be made to increase the participation of”. The balance requirement 
thus morphed from a principle of equal rights to participate to a responsibility to ensure adequate 
representation, in particular of potentially under-represented groups. The new version also features 
a new principle of independence of the ESOs from vested interests; and no longer suggests that 
the Commission could help in defining the modalities for the representation of different interests. 
 
Perhaps the most striking change is that the status quo of broad representation of different 
interests in European standardization is now explicitly portrayed as unsatisfactory. Rather than 
holding the SDOs to their own, self-determined principles, the European institutions request the 
ESOs to initiate changes (“further efforts should be made”).  
 
This increased emphasis on societal balance, and the requirement to proactively encourage 
greater representation of certain stakeholder groups, is reflected in CEN’s Internal Regulations 
[applicable to CEN members, i.e. the European NSBs]: 
 
The Member shall keep an impartial and independent position by ensuring an appropriate 
balance of the interests represented in the standards development process, i.e. private and 
public, economic, societal and environmental interests. The Member’s rules shall grant the 
same right to all stakeholders actively involved in the standardization work to express their 
opinions and to have them duly taken into account. 
 
The Member‘s rules shall ensure that all contributions are duly considered without 
favouring or ignoring any of them.” First, the list of interests (private and public, economic 
etc.) clearly refers to societal balance rather than balance between different industrial 
stakeholder groups; second, the requirement requires (1) impartiality of the organization 
itself, and (2) equal rights to participate for different interest groups (but does not seem to 
require parity in representation). 
 
Other stipulations in the Internal Regulation are also relevant, in particular:  
 
“2.3 Principle of appropriate representation of the stakeholders' interests in the Technical 
Bodies - The Member shall have a process in place to identify and take into account the 
needs of all stakeholders, with a view to facilitating appropriate representation and 
participation.” 
 
The principle of “sustainable development”, despite its name, is also a form of balance 
requirement: 
 
“Sustainable development is a means of expressing the broader expectations of society as 
a whole. This includes promoting and facilitating the involvement of all stakeholders, 
including potentially under-represented stakeholders such as SMEs and representatives of 
societal interests, in the development of standards, so as to ensure representation in a real 
multi-stakeholder-process.” 
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The next policy round followed from the EU-level discussions on growth, jobs and 
innovation.221 A European Parliament resolution222 set the tone for a complete overhaul of the legal 
framework for standardization in the EU. The strategic study accompanying the proposal for what 
would become Regulation 2015/2012 reaffirms the European approach to balance, which focuses 
on societal balance but also alludes to traditional balance. As the Commission states, “strong 
consensus is vital for a standard to be accepted and used by industry. Acceptance of the standard 
by other stakeholders is important in those areas where standards are used in support of public 
policy and legislation”.223 Interestingly, as part of the first plank – traditional balance expressed as 
consensus amongst the industry stakeholders – the Commission insists on adequate representation 
of SMEs, through the NSBs (for CEN and CENELEC) and directly within ETSI. The second 
plank, societal balance, is particularly relevant when standards touch upon public policy 
(performance standards), and it involves better representation of consumers, trade unions, 
environmental NGOs, among others.224 In addition, the Commission signals a change in how fora 
and consortia are treated under EU law: whereas 10 years earlier they were dismissively considered 
to fall short on legitimacy, they are now seen as a useful source of complementary standards, as 
long as these fora and consortia follow the same “quality criteria” as ESOs, including openness, 
transparency and neutrality.225 
 
These policy discussions hence did not lead to significant changes in the basic principles 
(emphasis on societal balance, proactive steps towards sufficient representation of certain groups). 
These principles underlie the enactment that arose out of the 2008-2012 policy round, now the 
current legislative framework for standardization in Europe, namely Regulation 1025/2012.226 The 
recitals to Regulation 1025/2012 explain how stakeholder representation is essential to the success 
of standardization.227 Stakeholders include representatives of environmental interests, consumer 
interests, employee interests (trade unions in particular) and SMEs. Regulation 1025/2012 governs 
the participation of stakeholders in standardization.228 In order to ensure meaningful participation, 
the Regulation even provides for EU funding of stakeholder organisations for those purposes.229 
 
Regulation 1025/2012 remains focused on participation in proceedings as a way to ensure 
representation. It does not require that ESOs grant any particular stakeholders voting rights.230 The 
only explicit mention of a balance requirement in Regulation 1025/2012 can be found in Annex 
 
221 See the Commission communication “Towards an increased contribution from standardization to innovation in 
Europe” COM(2008)133 (11 March 2008) and the White Paper “Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU – The 
Way Forward” COM(2009)324 (3 July 2009), which initiated the discussions. 
222 European Parliament Resolution of 21 October 2010 on the future of European standardisation [2012] OJ C 
70E/56. 
223  Commission Communication “A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward to enhance and 
accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020” COM(2011)311 (1 June 2011) at 11 (see also 
id. at 5). 
224 On that point, the Commission advocates looking to the ISO “alternative production line” (used for ISO 26000) 
for inspiration. Id. at 12. 
225 Id. at 15-17. 
226 Regulation 1025/2012 on European standardisation [2012] OJ L 316/12. 
227 Id., rec. 17, 20, 22. 
228 Id., Art. 5, 6 and 12. 
229 Id., Art. 16. 
230 Id., rec. 23. 
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II, which sets out the conditions under which ICT standards developed by SDOs other than ESOs 
can be recognized for public procurement purposes in the EU.231 In order to be considered, a 
standard must have been developed by a standards body which fulfills a number of criteria, 
including that “participation of all relevant categories of interested parties was sought with a view 
to achieving balance”. 
 
Following the enactment of Regulation 1025/2012, these basic principles remained unchanged. 
In the subsequent policy round, launched in 2016,232 the emphasis was shifted to implementation 
and integration at the EU level.233  The ESOs, the NSBs, the Commission and the stakeholders 
(industry, SMEs, workers, environmental organizations and citizen groups) together form the 
European Standardisation System (ESS). In 2016, the Commission launched a Joint Initiative on 
Standardisation (JIS) to improve the functioning of the ESS.234 Amongst its first set of actions, the 
JIS was tasked with fostering inclusiveness, transparency and effective participation of all 
stakeholders in the ESS, facilitating participation of all stakeholders at the national level, and 
improving the representation of European SMEs and societal stakeholders’ interests in 
international standardization processes. 235  In other words, a high-level forum including all 
stakeholders was created outside of the established SDOs – and to some extent above them – in 
order to put pressure on those SDOs, at national, European and international levels, to improve 
stakeholder representation. Coordination has also been improved through the introduction of an 
Annual Union Work Programme (AUWP) for European standardization, wherein the Commission 
communicates its priorities to all stakeholders. 
 
Over the last 35 years of European standardization policy, as outlined in the previous 
paragraphs, the EU has had to deal with significant changes in the standardization ecosystem and 
with the spillover from major EU-level policy debates. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the EU-wide 
drive for regulatory efficiency and trade liberalization led to the New Approach; in terms of 
balance, the emphasis was on traditional balance between potentially conflicting industry interests. 
Such balance was traditionally ensured within the NSBs that made up CEN and CENELEC. Yet 
when ETSI was created as a new, third ESO, it followed a different model, whereby balance was 
directly sought in the membership of the ESO. The co-existence of these two different models – 
national representation for CEN and CENELEC, direct industry membership for ETSI – made it 
unavoidable that they would be compared. As a consequence, EU standardization policy has been 
trying to “lift the veil” of national representation ever since the 1990s, in order to compel NSBs to 
meet EU-level expectations, in particular as regards procedural principles linked to balance, such 
as openness, transparency and consensus.  
 
 
231 Id., Art. 13. 
232 The round was launched with a “standardisation package”, i.e. a set of policy and administrative documents 
issued by the Commission in June 2016. The central piece was the Communication “European Standards for the 
21st Century” COM(2016)358 (1 June 2016). 
233  See European Parliament Resolution of 4 July 2017 on European standards for the 21st century, 
P8_TA(2017)0278, point 16 (expressing satisfaction with the content of Regulation 1025/2012 as far as balance is 
concerned, and calling for better implementation). 
234 The initiative had been announced in the European Commission Communication Upgrading the Single Market: 
more opportunities for people and business, COM(2015)550 (28 October 2015) at 12. 
235 Id. at 12. 
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In the late 1990s and 2000s, legitimacy and accountability came to the fore, in the wake of the 
post-Maastricht governance crisis in the EU. This is where the EU started to emphasize societal 
balance, in addition to traditional balance. The two were often bundled together in policy 
documents, but since the early 2000s the key policy documents posit that traditional balance 
corresponds to what is required under WTO law, and societal balance is an additional European 
requirement. The EU has gone very far in order to ensure that weaker stakeholders are represented 
not only in standardization processes, but also in SDO governance. The main stakeholders in the 
eyes of the EU whose adequate representation should be ensured are trade unions, consumer 
associations, environmental NGOs, and SMEs. Since the mid-2000s, standardization has gained 
in strategic significance for the EU, especially when innovativeness became an EU-wide priority. 
EU institutions were forced to acknowledge that standards development – especially in the ICT 
sector – takes place in large part outside of established SDOs, in industry-driven fora and consortia. 
Societal balance was then put forward as a key differentiating factor between established SDOs 
and their newer industry-driven counterparts. Ultimately, it became a condition for the latter to 
achieve recognition within the EU, as set out in Regulation 1025/2012. Nowadays, one of the main 
functions of the overarching coordination bodies, such as the Joint Initiative on Standardisation 
(in general) or the Multi-Stakeholder Platform (for ICT standards specifically),236 is to provide a 
space where all stakeholders can be represented and heard, and from which SDOs can be prodded 
to achieve societal balance.  
 
Throughout the different phases of its development, the framework for standardization 
regulation in Europe has focused on the officially recognized NSBs and ESOs. Just as in the U.S., 
industry stakeholders however often found it advantageous to create additional fora for 
standardization. One such organization is the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) project, which 
resulted in 1991 from a joint initiative by broadcasters, consumer electronics manufacturers and 
regulatory bodies. Drafting a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for DVB “meant that 
commercial competitors needed to appreciate their common requirements and agendas. Trust and 
mutual respect had to be established.”237 As a contribution to creating this necessary trust between 
different interest groups, the MoU provides for specific mechanisms to balance their interests. In 
particular, “to ensure a balanced representation of views from broadcasters, operators, 
manufacturers and administrations”, the MoU prescribes a specific composition of DVB’s central 
governance body, with specific numbers of seats reserved for each “constituency”.238 Furthermore, 







236 See Decision of 28 November 2011 setting up the European multi-stakeholder platform on ICT standardisation 
[2011] OJ C 349/4. 
237 https://dvb.org/about/history/, last consulted on 1/17/2021. 
238 DVB Memorandum of Understanding, Article 6.1. 
239 Id., Article 6.4. 
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D. EU COMPETITION POLICY AND BALANCE IN SDO IPR POLICIES 
In parallel with the development of EU standardization policy as part of the internal market, 
EU competition law also started to be applied to standardization activities. 
 
Starting with the XOpen case in 1996, 240  the Commission became concerned that 
standardization would be used in order to give an advantage to one competitor (or one set of 
competitors) over others. It was perceived that the remedy for this risk is openness and 
participation. Hence the Commission insisted on ensuring that all interested parties were able to 
participate in standardization, and that interested manufacturers had access to each standard, in 
order to implement it in their products. The Commission’s 2000 Horizontal Guidelines sum up the 
practice until then: if participation in standardization is “unrestricted and transparent” and the 
standards are voluntary, then there is no concern under competition law. 241 The Commission 
emphasizes participation first and foremost, rather than any more specific definition of balance 
between stakeholder interests: all competitors must have been involved in the discussion, and other 
stakeholders should also be at the table.242 
 
With the standardization of mobile telecommunications technology and the creation of ETSI 
in 1988, the intersection between standardization and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) became 
an important focus of European standardization policy. In its 1992 follow-up communication on 
the 1990 Green Paper, the European Commission focused exclusively on the interface between 
standardization and IPR. These policy efforts took place in the context of debates within ETSI 
regarding its IPR policy, opposing the interests of network operators (favoring strict licensing 
obligations for SEPs) and manufacturers (defending the rights of patent owners).243 In March 1993, 
ETSI’s General Assembly accepted an IPR policy that was heavily criticized by patent-centric 
manufacturers. Observers at the time alleged that the policy was only accepted due to an imbalance 
in the representation of manufacturers’ and operators’ interests within ETSI.244 The policy faced 
significant resistance, including a competition law complaint by a business association 
representing manufacturers to the European Commission. The European Commission however did 
not decide the merits of the complaint, as ETSI revised its policy and abandoned the controversial 
provisions in November 1994 “in order to achieve greater consensus amongst ETSI members.”245 
ETSI’s new IPR policy reflected a commitment to balance: “In achieving this objective, the ETSI 
IPR Policy seeks a balance between the needs of standardization for public use in the field of 
telecommunications and the rights of the owners of IPRs.” The area of IPR is the only context in 
which ETSI’s process documents make explicit mention of a balance requirement. 
 
 
240 Decision of 15 December 1986, X/Open Group [1986] OJ L 35/36. 
241 Guidelines on the applicability of Article [101 TFEU] to horizontal cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/2 at 
para. 163. 
242 Id. at 172. 
243 See generally Iversen, E. J. (1999). Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: ETSI's controversial search 
for new IPR-procedures. 
244 Rudi Bekkers, Geert Duysters, Bart Verspagen, Intellectual property rights and standardization: The case of 
GSM, 26 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 171, 180 (2002) (“The proposal was accepted mainly due to the considerable 
power that former telecom administrations have in ETSI, compared to that of the manufacturers and other actors” 
(citing Besen, 1990; Paffen, 1996; CBEMA, 1993)). 
245 Notice pursuant to Article 19 (3) of Council Regulation No 17 (') concerning case No IV/35.006 — ETSI interim 
IPR policy. 
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Perhaps due to the controversies at ETSI, the DVB project was careful in developing its IPR 
policy in the mid-1990s to balance the leadership of the subcommittees charged with developing 
an IPR policy between representatives of equipment manufacturers and broadcasters, the two 
principal commercial constituencies involved in the market.246 
 
The Horizontal Guidelines were renewed in 2010, taking into account the Commission practice 
on IPR policies in SDOs. 247  The general analysis set out in the 2000 Guidelines is further 
developed, with the emphasis being put once again on participation as the main path to achieving 
balance:248  
 
In particular, to ensure unrestricted participation the rules of the standard-setting 
organisation would need to guarantee that all competitors in the market or markets affected 
by the standard can participate in the process leading to the selection of the standard. The 
standard-setting organisations would also need to have objective and non-discriminatory 
procedures for allocating voting rights as well as, if relevant, objective criteria for selecting 
the technology to be included in the standard [emphasis in the original]. 
 
The concept of balance comes into the discussion when it comes to the more specific issue of 
the IPR policy. The 2010 Guidelines define a safe harbor  for SDOs complying with certain criteria, 
including a “balanced and clear IPR policy”. This safe harbor entails that these SDOs “would 
normally fall outside the scope of Article 101(1)”, i.e. not violate competition law prohibitions 
against restrictive agreements. According to the Guidelines, balancing would refer to the balance 
between the interests of different groups of participants (IPR holders, pure manufacturers, 
vertically-integrated firms) in the IPR policy.249 The Communication on SEP of 2017 greatly 
insists on the need for a “balanced approach” (10 mentions), yet it does not go any further than the 
2010 Horizontal Guidelines in defining balance.250  
 
 
V. THE MEANING OF BALANCE IN STANDARDIZATION  
 
Despite a widespread recognition that some degree of balancing of interests is appropriate and 
desirable in standards development, the historical account set forth in Parts II, III, and IV 
demonstrates that this important feature of standardization has developed along multiple 
independent pathways both in the U.S. and Europe. Variations are observed in both the 
conceptualization of whose interests should be weighed in any effort toward balancing, as well as 
the standard against which balancing efforts should be legally measured and assessed. We discuss 
each of these axes of comparison, and then offer our observations and conclusions. 
 
 
246 Carter Eltzroth, IPR Policy of the DVB Project: Negative Disclosure, FR&ND Arbitration Unless Pool Rules 
OK, Part 1, 6 J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 21, 30 (2008). 
247 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 [TFEU] to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1. 
248 Id. at para. 281. See also para. 295 and the examples given at para. 331 and 332. 
249 Id. at ¶¶ 284-85. 
250 European Commission, Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents COM(2017)712 (29 November 
2017). 
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A. TYPES OF INTERESTS TO BE BALANCED 
1. Traditional and Societal Balance Categories 
 
The traditional view of SDO interest balancing involved producers and users of standardized 
products, such as steel makers and railway companies. This traditional requirement seeks to 
balance representation of commercial stakeholder groups with direct, yet divergent, interests in a 
standard. Many SDOs seek balanced representation of these different  groups in order to elicit the 
relevant technical information and ensure acceptance of future standards by the principal 
stakeholder constituencies.  
 
More recently, the scope of the traditional notion of balance has been extended to other 
constituencies, reflecting more diverse commercial relationships in the marketplace.  In addition 
to producers and users, a perceived imbalance between producers and certifiers arose in the NSS 
case,251  in which a testing service company, NSS, sued the Anti-Malware Testing Standards 
Organization, Inc. (AMTSO), an SDO that develops cybersecurity software standards, and several 
of its members, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by colluding to develop standards that 
disadvantaged certain testing vendors and then refusing to deal with vendors who did not comply 
with those standards. In spite of the diversity of interest categories potentially involved, the 
traditional balance requirement focuses on situations in which the opposing stakeholder interests 
are largely corporate and industrial concerns, and the different stakeholders actively participate in 
standards development. 
 
In addition to seeking a balance of interests between different industrial and commercial 
concerns at different points in the supply chain, a broader notion of the need for societal 
participation in standardization emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Unlike the traditional balance 
requirement, which SDOs adopted as a means of ensuring acceptance of their standards by relevant 
(and powerful) stakeholder groups, the notion of societal balance originated in an external critique 
of private standards development and an effort to legitimize the private assumption of regulatory 
duties.252 While the concern with societal balance in standards development is not limited to any 
one class of standards, it is heightened with respect to standards that directly affect consumer 
safety. In addition, the formalization of societal balance requirements is often linked to the 
participation of government agencies in standards development and government’s use of voluntary 
industry standards for regulation and other purposes. In Europe, the representation of under-
represented societal interest groups in standards development is enshrined in the key enactment 
governing standardization in the EU, namely Regulation 1025/2012.253  
 
 
251 NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711 (N.D. Cal., filed Sep. 18, 2018). 
252  See CATHERINE E. RUDDER, A. LEE FRITSCHLER & YON JUNG CHOI, PUBLIC POLICY MAKING BY PRIVATE 
ORGANIZATIONS: CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 118 (2016) (“the democratic legitimacy of private 
and public-private [standards in the area of food safety] should be improved by increasing its transparency and 
broadening the voices involved in policy making”). 
253  Regulation 1025/2012, Art. 5, compels ESOs to achieve representative and participation of all relevant 
stakeholders in their activities. For that purpose, pursuant to Art. 16 of the Regulation, the EU budget provides for 
the financing of European stakeholder organisations representing SMEs, consumers, environmental interests and 
social interests. 
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 There is significant variation in the categories that are explicitly mentioned by different SDOs 
and regulatory instruments in this regard. An early and prominent societal group whose interests 
SDOs seek to account for was consumers.  ANSI and ASTM in the U.S. and DIN and BSI in 
Europe are examples of SDOs offering opportunities for the representation of consumer interests 
in standardization activities and SDO governance. 254  Other societal interests considered in 
standardization activities may include environmental interest groups, labor, and science. 
Nevertheless, discussions of balance typically focus on the opposition between industry as a whole 
and other interests, such as consumers, government, civil society, labor, etc. The objective of the 
balance requirement is not to achieve a balance among all identified categories, but to prevent one 
interest – industry – from using standardization to impose its preferences on the rest of society.255 
In some discussions, industry is sliced into different groups, most notably small and large 
corporations, where SMEs are added to the list of interests that need to be protected against 
domination of standards by large companies. 
 
Another difference resides in the means that have been contemplated to achieve the desired 
balance. The traditional balance requirement sought to reconcile the interests of different groups 
that actively engage in standards development; as noted above, some standards organizations 
pursued this balance by numerically equalizing the composition of standardization committees 
among experts affiliated with each group. Some proposals made in the 1970s seeking a more 
general balance of interests in standards development either did not explicitly mention balanced 
committee composition, or expressly described it as an inadequate tool for achieving the desired 
balance. Other proposals however explicitly refer to balance in membership composition as a 
necessary means of ensuring adequate representation.256  
 
Extending the traditional practice of balancing committee composition to the more recent, 
broader lists of societal interest categories, however, created fundamental theoretical and practical 
problems.257 Unlike the representatives of industrial users and producers of standardized products, 
there are few qualified experts volunteering to represent consumers, labor, or environmental 
concerns in standardization. As observed by Dieter Ernst and collaborators, “standardization is a 
highly knowledge-intensive activity that requires well educated and experienced engineers and 
 
254 See notes 31, 50-53 and 162-163, supra, and accompanying text. 
255  This is also consistent with ASTM’s explicit quota requirement, seeking to ensure that representatives of 
producers do not outnumber representatives of all other groups. See notes 25-26, supra, and accompanying text. 
256  An example of an attempt to enforce adequate representation of societal interests through a quota system is the 
1968 report of the select committee on small businesses of the House of Representatives: “It is the subcommittee’s 
conclusion that consumer representatives should be in the preponderance on standards committees.” – a far cry from 
the actual representation of consumers in standardization processes then and today. Final Report of the Select 
Committee on Small Businesses of the House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 181, 
257 Hamilton, Prospects, supra note 57, at x. 
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other professionals”,258  skills that are often lacking outside of the firms directly engaged in 
standardization activity.259  
 
Moreover, those purporting to speak on behalf of a particular interest category can not 
necessarily be trusted to represent all, or even most, members of that category. As Rudder and 
collaborators observe, “To call a representative ‘public’ without a clear demonstration of the 
person’s connection to the public is meaningless. Can there be meaningful representation of the 
public outside of free and fair elections…?”260  Moreover,  even academics and government 
officials have been accused of representing partisan interests in standardization activities, further 
eroding the value of this form of representation.261  
 
Compounding the difficulty of identifying willing, qualified and unbiased representatives of 
broader social categories is the inherent difficulty that such individuals face when trying to 
participate in many formal standardization activities.  These difficulties include the substantial 
financial and time commitments required to participate, the difficulty of gaining admittance to 
relevant SDO committees, and the risk that their views, once expressed, will be sidelined or 
ignored by professional standards-developers.262 
 
Given the difficulties of achieving societal balance through quotas and other formal 
mechanisms, the European Commission and some SDOs, such as ASTM and IETF, provide 
financial support to enhance representation of societal interests (e.g. consumers and representatives 
of developing countries) in relevant standardization activities.263 Yet these sporadic efforts have 
not resulted in significant levels of participation by representatives of such constituencies in most 
standardization activities.264  
 
 
258 Dieter Ernst, Heejin Lee & Jooyoung Kim, Standards, Innovation and Latecomer Economic Development: 
Conceptual Issues and Policy Challenges, 38 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 853, 855 (2014). See also Morris, 
supra note 160, at 8-9 (describing challenges to participation in standards development by public policy advocates). 
Given this dearth of public expertise in standardization, in some cases large corporate interests purport to represent 
consumer interests, as was the case at ANSI, when the Sears Roebuck Corporation sat on its Consumer Council. 
Hamilton, Roles, supra note 26, at 1385 n. 157. 
259 This being said, some standardization activities are driven not by large ICT firms, but by interested individuals 
and non-corporate communities.  For example, IEEE Working Group P2890 - Recommended Practice for 
Provenance of Indigenous Peoples’ Data (https://standards.ieee.org/project/2890.html) was formed by academics, 
philanthropic organizations and members of indigenous communities, and does not have substantial corporate 
involvement. However, the engagement of this working group’s members with standardization is not likely to lead 
to their greater involvement with more complex ICT standards, as their goals are relatively specific to this project, 
and not directed generally toward product or technology standardization. 
260 RUDDER ET AL., supra note 252, at 155. 
261 FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82, at x. 
262 See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 222-24 (2011); CARGILL, supra note 153, at 108 (“while the [standardization] process is open to 
both the rich and the poor, the rich have easier access to it”). 
263 See notes 31, 162 and 163, supra, and accompanying text. 
264 See BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 262, at 222 (“consumer participation in international product standardization 
… is strikingly weak”); JRC Report, supra note 2, at 120. 
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2. Vertical versus Horizontal Stakeholder Categories  
The relationship among the traditional categories of interests to be balanced is largely vertical.  
That is, producers of standardized products – automotive parts, electrical components, synthetic 
fibers – stand in a vertical relationship to the industrial purchasers of those products – 
manufacturers of cars, computers and apparel, as well as wholesalers and retailers. These industrial 
purchasers likewise stand in a vertical relationship to consumers, workers, environmental interests, 
and the like.  And, in the case of NSS, producers of cybersecurity solutions stand in a vertical 
relationship to security certifying bodies that assess their products. 
 
Over the past few decades, however, there have been increasing calls for SDO balance among 
competing horizontal interests. In some cases, individual firms considered that the standardization 
process had been skewed in favor of a competitor from the same industry (as alleged in ASME v. 
Hydrolevel).265 In other cases, SDO processes were found to be imbalanced between different 
groups of suppliers producing goods that could be used for the same purpose, such as the steel and 
plastic conduit manufacturers in Allied Tube.266  
 
According to some organizations’ definitions, the requirement not to skew standardization 
processes in favor of individual firms or individual technical solutions is the goal of a separate 
procedural requirement – absence of dominance – which must be distinguished from balance.267 
Nevertheless, other organizations define balance as a state in which “standards activities are not 
exclusively dominated by any particular person, company or interest group.”268  
 
Disputes over technical choices, and the exclusion of one vendor’s solution over another’s, 
continue to arise in standards-development, with associated antitrust claims.  Such claims were 
raised, for example, in Addamax v.OSF,269  TruePosition v. Ericsson270 and Golden Bridge v. 
Motorola.271 These disputes involved allegations of an imbalance in the standardization process, 
resulting e.g. from a partisan exercise of the working group chair function, or deliberate “stacking 
the room” and/or “vote stuffing” by SDO members. But while the plaintiff in each of these cases 
alleged anticompetitive collusion by members of an SDO, and in some cases by the SDO itself, 
the issue of SDO balancing of interests was not addressed by the courts in any of these cases. 
 
Of course, actions skewing the balance between competitors also may result in an imbalance 
between interest categories protected by an SDO’s balance requirements. Nevertheless, this does 
not imply that traditional or legal balance requirements obligate SDOs to balance the membership 
of standardization committees between competing firms or proponents of competing technology 
solutions. Indeed, such a requirement would seem to undermine the ability of SDOs to make 
technical choices. Standards organizations exist to select among different technical solutions such 
 
265 See notes 103-106, supra, and accompanying text. 
266 See notes 108-116, supra, and accompanying text.   
267 See e.g. ANSI’s Guidance on Balance and Outreach document from 2016: “Balance and a lack of dominance 
are two distinct considerations. The existence of a balanced consensus body does not preclude the exercise of 
dominance. Similarly, the existence of a less than perfectly balanced consensus body does not necessarily reflect a 
process in which dominance automatically occurs.” ANSI Balance Guidance, supra note 143. 
268 See OpenStand Principles, supra note 161. 
269 Addamax Corporation v. Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998). 
270 TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co. 977 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
271 Golden Bridge v. Motorola, 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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as steel and plastic as appropriate materials for electrical conduit. Requiring a consensus between 
plastic and steel makers would undermine that goal. Thus, the Court in Allied Tube did not require 
that standards committees be balanced between competing commercial interests; but only that the 
standardization process not be stacked in favor of one solution to the detriment of the other. 
 
These disputes raise a concept of balance that differs from the “traditional” requirement to 
balance the representation of vertically related interest groups. The perceived need to balance 
representation between manufacturers and users of standardized goods chiefly resulted from a 
recognition that any standard will only be used if it is acceptable to both of these groups. When 
the interests of producers and users diverge, such as in the case of steel makers and railway 
companies, a standardization process that only reflects the voices of users or producers would often 
fail to achieve the necessary compromise between divergent interests.  
 
By contrast, with respect to competitors proposing competing solutions for a particular 
application, the success of the standard results from the fact that users may rely on the standard to 
inform their adoption decisions.272 This necessary trust would be undermined by a process that is 
lopsided in favor of a particular technical solution, such as a particular conduit material. 
Nevertheless, a standard resulting from a commercial compromise between competing suppliers 
of different solutions (e.g., an agreement to recommend electrical conduits with one coat of plastic 
and one coat of steel), would similarly fail to gain the trust of the market. Rather, standardization 
processes must offer a forum for the objective assessment of different technical solutions that is 
unbiased with respect to the special interests of competing providers. An unbiased standardization 
process should not exclude a technical solution merely to favor the interests of some participants. 
This being said, it should also not withhold a technically justified choice merely to balance rivaling 
special interests. 
 
Balancing committee composition along interest categories may nevertheless support the 
elimination of bias in the process. A committee stacked with representatives of a certain type of 
producer (as in Allied Tube) is unlikely to be unbiased. In a balanced committee that includes an 
adequate mix of representatives of different types of producers, users and other relevant interest 
groups, any group of particular interests must convince a large group of others of the technical 
merit of their proposed solution. The legitimacy of the process does not result from parity in the 
representation of different types of competing producers, but from the fact that no group alone can 
enact standardization decisions without the support of other constituencies  that have no vested 
interest in the competing solutions. While balancing representation by different interest categories 
may thus foster an unbiased environment, balancing the representation of proponents of different 
technical solutions within the same interest category is not required, as long as none of the 
competing interests is in a position to dominate the process.   
 
3. IPR Policy Balance  
Today, the most high-profile conflicts over SDO balance are not between suppliers of 
competing technical solutions, but between patent-centric and product-centric firms. 273  As 
 
272 E.g. builders relying on NFPA’s standards for choosing a fire-proof material for electrical conduit, or an industrial 
customer relying on ASME’s “Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code” when choosing a safe boiler control device 
273 See note 165, supra, and accompanying text. 
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discussed above, this debate has centered largely around “balance” in SDO intellectual property 
policies, and allegations that one faction or the other has unfairly skewed SDO policies or decisions 
toward the other faction’s preferred outcome.  
 
Conflicts between patent- and product-centric interests may involve horizontal balance (or the 
absence thereof), as patent- and product-centric solutions may compete in the process of standards 
development. For the most part, however, the debate over IPR policy making signifies a return to 
a vertical notion of balance, where balance is not intended to allow for unbiased consideration of 
competing solutions, but to find a middle ground between the conflicting interests of different 
commercial constituencies that are vertically related to each other through business relationships 
that are impacted by an SDO’s decisions. Similar to the goal of balancing the interests of the 
producers and users of standardized goods, some SDOs perceive this balance between the interests 
of patent- and product-centric firms as important, as their policies need to garner support from 
both groups of firms in order for their standards to succeed in the market.274 
 
Societal balance has moved to the background in these debates. Consumer welfare is frequently 
invoked – the sides arguing, respectively, that consumers are better off with lower-priced products 
or greater incentives for new product innovation – yet few genuine consumer-oriented 
organizations have taken an active part in the debate over IPR policies, which is being waged 
largely between large industrial concerns with differing market strategies and goals.275 This is 
similar to what has been observed in the context of cases such as Hydrolevel and Allied Tube, 
which were waged between commercial stakeholders without significant participation by 
consumer interest groups, even though the disputes were later used to justify policy proposals 
intended to promote consumer representation. 
 
In spite of these similarities, there are differences between IPR policy balance and stakeholder 
balance requirements. Stakeholder balance requirements are concerned with a balanced 
representation of different stakeholder constituencies in a standardization process. More recent 
discussions of balance in the context of IPR policies emphasize both balance in policy substance 
and balanced representation of patent- and product-centric firms in the process of developing IPR 
policies.276 Neither of these dimensions is fully aligned with traditional balance requirements.  
 
Several legal sources of SDO process balance requirements – such as ANSI’s Essential 
Requirements, OMB Circular A-119, and ISO/IEC Guide 59:2019 – are explicitly limited to 
processes for standards development, to the exclusion of processes for the development of SDO 
 
274 Malcolm Johnson, Director of ITU’s Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, e.g. stated in 2014 “A well-
balanced IPR policy is likely to attract all types of stakeholders to the standardization process. However, if the IPR 
policy overly favours patent holders, then the standard may not meet users’ needs, and not be readily implementable. 
Similarly, if the IPR policy overly favours users, then patent holders may decide not to contribute their technology 
to the standardization process”. ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, Understanding patents, 
competition & standardization in an interconnected world, 2014, at 55. 
275 JRC Report, supra note 2, at 169. 
276 For example, the DVB Forum was careful in developing its IPR policy in the mid-1990s to balance the leadership 
of the subcommittees charged with developing an IPR policy between representatives of equipment manufacturers 
and broadcasters, the two principal commercial constituencies involved in the market. Eltzroth, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 30.  On the other hand, allegations have been made that the IEEE-SA process for 
developing amendments to its IPR policy in 2015 lacked balanced representation among product- and patent-centric 
firms.  See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 165. 
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policies. While many SDOs seek balanced representation of different interests [] in governance 
processes, as evidenced by explicit balance requirements for boards at various European NSBs,277 
these practices are not necessarily required by external regulations. 
   
Legal sources requiring IPR policy balance – such as OMB Circular A-119 or the Horizontal 
Guidelines of the European Commission – explicitly focus on the balanced nature of the policy 
itself, i.e. a focus on a balanced outcome rather than a balanced policy development process. The 
notion of policy balance (or balanced substance) is distinct from traditional requirements of 
balanced representation and, as discussed above, does not find a parallel in the development of 
technical standards themselves. Nevertheless, the substance of an SDO’s IPR policy (independent 
of the policy development process) may affect participation in the standards development process, 
and thus may indirectly affect (traditional) balanced representation of different stakeholder 
constituencies in those processes.278  
 
Independent of an SDO’s traditional balance requirements, there may be antitrust and 
competition law implications for balance, or lack thereof, in the IPR policy development process. 
Even before the Trump administration’s increased emphasis on IPR policies, the U.S. DOJ in its 
original (2015) IEEE BRL recognized that a revision of an SDO’s IPR policy through an 
unbalanced process may raise antitrust concerns.279  
 
 
277 “At AFNOR, decisions in technical committees on standard development are never taken by vote, and are always 
adopted by consensus. By contrast, AFNOR’s governance body, the Comité de coordination et de pilotage de la 
normalisation (CCPN), and the board of directors of AFNOR can make decisions on rule changes by majority vote. 
AFNOR explains this difference by noting that technical committees are open to everybody, whereas the CCPN and 
board of directors have a clearly defined membership, which is balanced among different constituencies.” See JRC 
Report, supra note 2, at 99. 
278 During the Trump Administration, the U.S. DOJ repeatedly emphasized the relationship between IPR policy 
balance and participation in the standards development process. For example, the DOJ stated in its 2020 
supplemental letter relating to IEEE’s 2015 policy change: “Balance is therefore important not only to encourage 
participation and competition among patent holders in the standard-setting process, but also to ensure more 
significant antitrust concerns do not arise. The rules that govern standard setting activity should be unbiased in order 
to maximize participation and to allow SDOs to achieve the best technical solutions in their standards.” DOJ IEEE 
Update Letter, supra note 170 at 11. The DOJ’s 2018 letter to ANSI similarly cautioned that “If an SSO’s intellectual 
property rights policy is too restrictive for one side or the other, it also risks deterring participation in procompetitive 
standard setting.” DOJ ANSI Letter, supra note 170. 
279 See DOJ 2015 IEEE Letter, supra note 173. 
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Table 1 
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B. LEGAL AND POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALANCE 
Related to, but separate from, the question of which interests to balance is the question of what 
SDOs should, or must, do in order to achieve the desired degree of balance among those competing 
interests. A number of different approaches have emerged over the years that vary in terms of their 
specificity and stringency – the degree to which different behaviors are prohibited or mandated. 
Very generally, balance requirements fall into three categories: (1) requirements that individual 
SDOs have voluntarily chosen to adopt; these requirements may be very stringent and specific; (2) 
requirements that are imposed on only a set of SDOs with a privileged status in their country or 
region, or requirements governing whether an SDO may qualify for certain advantages, such as 
accreditation, government use of their standards, or antitrust liability protections; these 
requirements are usually general and flexible; and (3) requirements that are mandatory for all 
SDOs as a matter of law; these are even more general, and in both Europe and the U.S. there is 
only limited guidance to define the substance of these requirements.  
 
These categories are largely orthogonal to the distinctions between different types of balance 
requirements discussed in Part V.A. Considerations of  each of the different types of balance are 
potentially relevant to the requirements voluntarily chosen by individual SDOs, requirements 
applicable to specific SDOs or attached to specific advantages, and requirements generally 
applicable to all. Nevertheless, some types of balance requirements are more relevant at different 
levels than others. Societal balance, for example, is particularly relevant to specific SDOs with a 
privileged status, such as NSBs and ESOs, and for SDOs’ standards to qualify for government use, 
whereas general antitrust requirements and SDOs’ own traditional balance requirements are mostly 
concerned with the balance between competing industry interests.  
 
Similar to the distinction between different types of balance requirements, the distinction 
between different levels of obligation is applicable in both Europe and the U.S. Government use 
of industry standards is governed by different systems in the two regions. While Europe has a 
system of official recognition of NSBs and ESOs, U.S. federal agencies are required under OMB 
Circular A-119 to rely on voluntary consensus standards (i.e., developed under systems that 
include balance).280 There are thus notable differences between Europe and the U.S. regarding the 
second category of balance requirements, i.e. those applicable to certain SDOs or attached to 
certain purposes; but there are few indications that the balance requirements voluntarily chosen by 
individual SDOs or the balance obligations generally applicable to all SDOs fundamentally differ 
between Europe and the U.S. 
 
At one end of the spectrum, there are the very stringent, explicit and specific balancing 
requirements of individual SDOs. SDOs such as ASTM and DVB, for example, categorize their 
members in different categories, and numerically balance the representation of these categories for 
voting purposes. These policies are imposed purely by choice of the SDO’s governing body as 
representative of its membership.281 These specific balancing processes are clearly not required of 
 
280 See, generally, Emily S. Bremer, American and European Perspectives on Private Standards in Public Law, 91 
TUL. L. REV. 325 (2016). 
281 See notes 25-26, supra, and accompanying text. In observing the practical operation of the mandatory quota 
requirement at ASTM, Professor Robert Hamilton has noted that while formal voting committees at ASTM do, 
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all SDOs. Some SDOs, such as IETF and W3C, intentionally forego formal balancing measures, 
but seek to achieve stakeholder balance through open and transparent processes and procedures 
(what we have termed “practical balance”).282 The interests that SDOs choose to balance are often 
defined by the stakeholders that SDOs view as being critical for the success of their standards – 
such as the different constituencies of DVB,283 and the IPR holders and implementers emphasized 
by ETSI’s and ITU-T’s commitments to IPR policy balance. 
 
At the second level, there are less stringent balance of interest requirements applicable to (a 
large number of) specific SDOs. Private regulatory instruments define requirements for SDOs 
seeking a certain privileged position, e.g. to develop ANSI-accredited American National 
Standards, or to represent a country’s interests in ISO or IEC. Both ANSI’s Essential Requirements 
and ISO/IEC Guide 59 define balance of interest requirements. The requirements defined by ANSI 
and ISO/IEC, in their current formulations, are less specific than those implemented by individual 
SDOs such as ASTM (which itself is ANSI-accredited). Nevertheless, these guidelines are 
intended and designed to be enforceable. 284 The balance requirements of ANSI and ISO/IEC are 
also less stringent than some individual SDOs’ balance requirements; in particular, they emphasize 
an obligation to seek rather than to achieve balance. The “historical criteria” of balance, i.e. 
numerical parity of representation of different constituencies on technical committees, are not 
required by ANSI (even though it is viewed as usually achieving ANSI’s own balance 
requirements), and discouraged by ISO/IEC. Individual SDOs may choose to offer more specific 
balancing mechanisms; and may also choose to seek a desired level of balance exceeding the levels 
required by ANSI or ISO/IEC.285 Both ANSI and ISO/IEC expect SDOs to seek a balance between 
both traditional and societal interest categories. 
 
 
indeed, hew to these quota requirements, much of the detailed standards-development work at ASTM is conducted 
by smaller expert working groups that largely represent the industrial sector. Hamilton, Roles, supra note 26, at 
1355. Quota requirements present challenges both in defining useful stakeholder categories and ensuring that 
selected representatives of those categories actually represent the interests of other members of the category. Id.  
What’s more, when categories include stakeholders who are diffuse or lack sufficient expertise or financial resources 
to engage substantively in SDO deliberations, it is often difficult to secure their meaningful participation in SDO 
activities. See JRC Report, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing balance in voting requirements at DVB Project and 
ETSI). Finally, quotas themselves may unfairly skew SDO decision making when the representatives of very small 
stakeholder groups are given the same voting privileges as representatives of much larger or more technically or 
economically significant groups. As such, it is not clear that mandatory quota requirements actually achieve their 
goals, or that such goals are even attainable in a practical sense. Hamilton, Roles, supra note 26, at 1354-55. 
Nevertheless, they remain important both historically and in numerous SDO policies today. 
282 See Part x, supra. 
283 The four constituencies are: Content providers and broadcasters; infrastructure providers and network operators; 
manufacturers and software suppliers; and governments and national regulatory bodies. 
284 The ANSI Balance Guidance, supra note 143, specifies that “ASDs must retain documentation that demonstrates 
appropriate outreach efforts to solicit a balanced consensus body.” The ISO membership manual lists “Procedures”, 
“Review”, and “Business Plans” as “typical evidence” to establish that committees represent a balance of interests. 
Furthermore, “Forms – voting records”; “Membership data – reports”; and “Minutes of meetings” are considered 
“typical evidence” to assess representivity or balance of a committee, working group or mirror committee; ISO 
Membership Manual, 2015; at 21. 
https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/iso_membership_manual.pdf  
285 Using the terminology of the JRC Report, these would be “baseline-plus” policies. See JRC Report, supra note 
2, at 145-46. 
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In addition to these requirements defined by private organizations, there are legal obligations 
applicable to specific SDOs, including Regulation 1025/2012 in Europe, and national regulations 
in some European countries. These legal requirements are the result of formal government 
recognition by institutions of the European Union or national governments of European countries, 
for which there is no equivalent in the U.S. These instruments often require SDOs to seek societal 
balance, i.e. allow for sufficient representation of potentially under-represented stakeholder groups 
and interests, such as consumers, environmental groups, workers, etc; but provide few or no 
provisions on balance of interests between different groups of industry stakeholders. At least in 
the view of European policy makers, this emphasis on under-represented societal stakeholder 
groups is a defining characteristic of the European approach to standardization. 
 
Furthermore, some legal instruments provide benefits to SDOs that offer a specified level of 
balance of interests. In the U.S., OMB Circular A-119 and the SDOAA apply to SDOs offering 
balanced deliberative processes. Neither the Circular nor the SDOAA impose mandatory legal 
requirements on SDOs or their members. Rather, they create optional sets of criteria that SDOs 
may adhere to if they wish to take advantage of the benefits offered by those regulatory and 
statutory schema. The Circular establishes which SDO-developed standards are suitable for federal 
government use in its procurement and regulatory functions, and the SDOAA establishes a safe 
harbor from certain antitrust liability for SDOs that elect to comply with its requirements.286 In 
Europe, Annex II of Regulation 1025/2012 allows the use of certain standards for public 
procurement, requiring inter alia a balance of interests in the standards development process. 
Similar to OMB Circular A-119, this does not define an obligation of the SDO, but directs 
government agencies to use only standards developed by SDOs complying with these criteria.  
 
In addition to being non-binding, balance requirements attached to these statutory or regulatory 
benefits are very general, and there is no clear mechanism to assess whether SDOs meet the 
requirements. In the EU, it is the role of the Multi-Stakeholder Platform (MSP) to determine 
whether individual standards comply with the criteria of Annex II, but the MSP does not accredit 
or evaluate SDOs or their processes. In the United States, there has been a conscious policy choice 
against systematic government review or accreditation of private SDOs or their standards. Certain 
benefits under the SDOAA are predicated on an open registration system. In NSS, the US DOJ 
urged the court to test whether AMSTO complied with the procedural requirements underlying the 
SDOAA, but the antitrust complaint was dismissed before any substantive adjudication of these 
issues.287 
 
Given the generality of these requirements and the scarcity of formal reviews of SDO 
processes, the specific degree of balance that they require remains open to interpretation. The rules 
generally emphasize openness as a condition of balance. The earliest formulation of OMB Circular 
A-119 as well as Annex II of Regulation 1025/2012 furthermore call on SDOs to “invite” or “seek” 
participation from diverse parties or interest groups, echoing ANSI’s requirement of active 
outreach. The current version of the Circular, calling for “meaningful participation from a broad 
range of parties” and prohibiting dominance by a single interest, seems to be more open, and 
 
286 As noted above, compliance with the SDOAA triggers use of the “rule of reason” approach to antitrust analysis 
and excludes treble damages for an antitrust violation. 
287 NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711 (N.D. Cal., filed Sep. 18, 2018). 
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appears intended to encompass both ANSI’s definition of balance, as well as SDOs that rely on 
general openness and transparency for stakeholder balance.288  
 
The balance requirements encapsulated in OMB Circular A-119 (and by extension the 
SDOAA) and the trajectory of European standardization regulation leading to the current 
formulation of Regulation 1025 largely emanate from an external critique of the effective power 
of private SDOs by advocates of consumers, small businesses, and environmental interests. At 
least historically, these requirements are thus primarily associated with societal balance. 
Nevertheless, over time, their scope has been extended to encompass e.g. IPR policy balance. 
 
Another source of balance requirements is international trade law. The very general balance 
requirement under the TBT Agreement, most specifically defined by the TBT Committee decision 
of 2000, is part of the TBT’s “Code of Good Practice”.289 The Code of Good Practice “is open to 
acceptance by any standardizing body within the territory of a Member of the WTO”, and does not 
constitute any direct obligation for private SDOs. Countries that are member of the TBT agreement 
“shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that local government 
and non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territories […] accept and comply with 
this Code of Good Practice”; a requirement applicable to their respective standardization 
regulations as outlined above. 
 
At the third level, competition law defines a minimum level of balance required of all SDOs. 
To a large degree, SDOs allow competitors to come together to engage in behavior that replaces 
market competition. As such, this collective behavior must be policed by antitrust and competition 
law. As recently noted by the U.S. DOJ, “Without the disciplining effect of competition, 
collaboratively set standards may serve the interests of the most powerful participants in the 
process, to the detriment of consumers. … [T]he standard-setting process may risk anticompetitive 
outcomes, if proper safeguards are not practiced by the standard setting organization to ensure that 
the participants represent the market interests as a whole.” 290 
 
These required safeguards comprise an obligation to ensure at least some level of stakeholder 
balance during standards development. Clearly, the intentional unbalancing of SDO deliberations 
– “stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic interest 
in restraining competition” (Allied Tube) – is sanctionable under the antitrust laws. This is a 
minimum requirement for all SDOs – facilitating an intentional imbalance in SDO decision making 
processes in view of restraining competition is prohibited to all. 
 
There are some indications that in addition to refraining from intentionally biasing the process, 
SDOs may also have to undertake at least some active steps to provide for a certain minimum level 
 
288 The Discussion and Responses to Significant Comments provided along the revised OMB Circular A-119 in 2016 
reveals the ambivalence of the Circular’s definition of balance. The OMB explains that it intended its definition of 
balance to be “consistent” with ANSI’s Essential Requirements (which differentiate balance from dominance); while 
also expressing agreement with other commenters stating that “a key objective of ‘balance’ is preventing a single 
interest from dominating the decision-making process.” OMB Circular A-119 (2016), Supplementary Material, 
Discussion and Responses to Significant Comments, at 9. This underscores the OMB’s intention for the definition 
to “allow for flexibility how balance is determined.”  
289 See notes x, supra, and accompanying text. 
290 DOJ GSMA Letter, supra note 172, at 4. 
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of balance. In ASME v. Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court recognized the general principle that SDOs 
may be liable for anticompetitive conduct of SDO participants, as the SDO itself is best positioned 
to adopt procedures that minimize the risk of anticompetitive conduct.291 Nevertheless, it did not 
elaborate on what specific procedures SDOs must adopt or possess in order to prevent violations 
of antitrust laws. In its Final Staff Report of 1983,292 the FTC built on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Silver v New York Stock Exchange293 to develop some general procedural principles 
required of any standardization process capable of producing restrictive effects, including notice, 
the opportunity to file a complaint to the SDO, and the right to a written response.294  In Allied 
Tube, the Supreme Court affirmed that “private standard-setting by associations comprising firms 
with horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all under the antitrust laws only on 
the understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive 
benefits”.295 Overall, the acceptability of SDOs under antitrust laws is premised on a minimum 
level of due process and lack of bias, which may be compromised by extreme imbalances in the 
representation of different interests. Nevertheless, there is no general definition of what minimum 
balance level is generally required of SDOs, and especially in the United States, there has been a 
conscious policy choice against providing such a general definition.   
 
It is clear however that the traditional (“historical”) balance requirements practiced by some 
SDOs, the institutional norms embodied in the requirements of ANSI, CEN, and ISO/IEC, or 
regulatory instruments conferring specific advantages to certain SDOs (such as OMB Circular A-
119, the SDOAA, Regulation 1025, and the European Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines) are 
not compulsory as a matter of competition or antitrust law. Providing for balance in line with these 
more specific (and potentially more stringent) requirements is often seen as helpful for SDOs to 
comply with their basic obligations under competition law; it may confer a presumption of 
compliance; and offer protection against liability of the SDO for abuses committed by individual 
participants. However, failure to comply with any of these requirements alone is not an antitrust 
or competition law violation.  
 
The minimum level of balance required of all SDOs as a matter of competition law thus falls 
somewhere between the abusive and clearly illegal tactics alleged in Allied Tube – packing the 
room with unqualified voters, paying for individuals to attend SDO meetings solely for the purpose 
of voting, and otherwise corrupting the legitimate deliberative process – and the general and 
flexible affirmative balance requirements attached to Circular A-119, the SDOAA, Regulation 
1025, and the Horizontal Guidelines.  
 
It seems likely that the minimal balance requirements under generally applicable antitrust laws 
vary from one SDO to the other. The Supreme Court decisions in Hydrolevel and Allied Tube 
concerned safety standards – a set of standards for which an imbalance in the representation of 
different interests has traditionally been seen as particularly problematic (as evidenced e.g. by the 
distinction historically made in this regard by ANSI). Also, in both these cases, the originally 
voluntary standards developed by private SDOs acquired binding effects, e.g. through their 
 
291 456 U.S. at x. 
292 FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82. 
293 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
294 See supra note x. 
295 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at x. 
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influence on governmental regulation. The effective power that SDOs such as NFPA and ASME 
wield over entire industries warrants particular antitrust scrutiny;296 but also sets these SDOs apart 
from numerous smaller and less established consortia that are arguably less capable of producing 
restrictive effects. The Horizontal Guidelines of the European Commission operate a similar 
distinction between different SDOs, noting that “in the absence of market power, a standardisation 
agreement is not capable of producing restrictive effects on competition.” Only those SDOs 
capable of producing restrictive effects are invited to adopt certain standardization process 
principles (such as a balanced IPR policy) in order to benefit from the Horizontal Guidelines’ safe 
harbor provisions. 
 
The U.S. DOJ’s 2019 investigation of GSMA sheds additional light on the balance 
requirements applicable to all SDOs as a matter of antitrust law. 297  In this matter, the 
standardization process criticized by the DOJ appeared to be unbalanced, offering one class of 
companies (operators) privileges and influence over the standardization process that were not 
available to other GSMA members (technology providers). Unlike Allied Tube, however, this 
imbalance allegedly resulted from members’ exercise of their rights under the SDO’s unbalanced 
policies, rather than the collusion of some SDO members to usurp the standardization process. 
Even though GSMA is not bound by any specific balance requirements other than those applicable 
to all SDOs, it accepted the DOJ’s demand to revise its policies and balance the rights of its 
operator and other members, thus highlighting the potential for antitrust enforcement to correct 
imbalances in standardization processes beyond those resulting from clearly illegal tactics 
violating the letter and the spirit of the SDO’s own policies.298  
 
A similar spectrum of requirements defines the concept of “policy balance” and the balancing 
of interests among “patent-centric” and “product-centric” firms. Individual SDOs have chosen – 
sometimes encouraged or directed by regulatory authorities – to require their IPR policy to balance 
these competing interests. Furthermore, regulatory instruments reserve certain advantages to SDOs 
offering balanced IPR policies, such as the competition law safe harbors provided by the SDOAA 
and the European Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines, and the regulatory advantages offered by 
OMB Circular A-119 and Regulation 1025. In contrast, the general requirements applicable to all 
SDOs as a matter of general antitrust and competition law are significantly less stringent and less 
specific. That being said, as in the case of balance of representation, SDOs that wish to impose 
greater degrees of balance between different categories of industrial producers may do so, so long 
as those requirements do not themselves amount to abusive or anticompetitive practices. 
 
 
296 “ASME wields great power in the Nation's economy. Its codes and standards influence the policies of numerous 
States and cities. […] ASME can be said to be "in reality, an extragovernmental agency which prescribes rules for 
the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce."” Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 570. 
297 See DOJ GSMA Letter, supra note 172. 
298 See id. 
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Table 2 below summarizes the range of different SDO balance requirements based on these 
observations. 
Table 2 
Legal and Policy Requirements for SDO Balance 
 
Tier Balance Requirement Description Examples Applies to 
1 Lack of bias Prohibits “stacking” SDO 
processes with stakeholders 
sharing an interest in stifling 





2 Non-domination No single interest should 





SDOs wishing to take 
advantage of statutory 
benefits under SDOAA 
and OMB Circular A-119 
3 Practical Balance SDO processes are 
practically balanced; e.g. 
because of openness to any 





Any SDO wishing to 
adopt an open door 
policy; SDOs seeking for 
their standards to be 
recognized as state of the 
art 
4 Obligation to seek 
balance 
SDO must take affirmative 





CEN Guide 4; 
Regulation 
1025 
SDOs that wish to be 
accredited by ANSI; 
SDOs formally 
recognized by certain 
European governmental 
bodies 
5 Numerical balance (e.g. 
quotas) 
SDO voting committees 
must satisfy numerical 
balance requirements (or 
majority approval by each 












6 Policy balance SDO policies should reflect 
a balanced treatment of 
different stakeholders 
categories (e.g., patent-







SDOs seeking to offer a 
balanced IPR policy; 
SDOs wishing to benefit 
from Safe Harbor under 
EU Competition Law and 
regulatory benefits under 
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Balance in SDO decision making is an expected and important aspect of collaborative 
standardization. Our historical review of international law, US law and EU law allows us to 
distinguish between different types of balancing requirements. ‘Traditional’ balancing concerns 
the industrial interests involved in standardization. Within it, a distinction can be made between 
vertical balancing – where an SDO must avoid that interest groups collude within the SDO to gain 
an advantage over others, whether in standardization or policymaking processes – and horiztonal 
balancing, where the proponents of one technological solution use the SDO to exclude competing 
solutions without justification. Next to these two dimensions of traditional balancing, ‘societal’ 
balancing has also emerged as a concern: it is defined as the balance amongst a broader set of 
stakeholders, including not only industry, but also consumers, workers and environmental groups, 
among others. 
 
Antitrust and competition law are concerned with ‘traditional’ balancing, both vertical and 
horizontal. At some level, they impose constraints on biased SDO processes.  But SDOs may 
select, based on their individual policy preferences, risk aversion and stakeholder composition, 
what degree of balance they wish to enforce above baseline legal requirements. Some SDOs, such 
as IETF, may desire to impose no such balance requirements, relying instead on openness and 
transparency to ensure a fair and legitimate process – what we term “practical balance”. SDOs that 
wish their standards to be adopted by U.S. federal agencies or used for public procurement 
purposes in the U.S. and Europe must comply with the general and flexible balance requirements 
of OMB Circular A-119 and Regulation 1025/2012; and those that wish to benefit from the liability 
protections of the SDOAA must do the same. Those that wish to be accredited by ANSI must 
adhere to the affirmative balancing obligations set forth in its Essential Requirements, and other, 
similarly affirmative obligations apply to NSBs representing their countries in ISO or IEC. Some 
SDOs, such as ASTM and DVB, impose strict numerical balancing mechanisms such as quotas on 
participation by different interest groups. The latest debates over SDO balance involves the 
processes for developing SDO IPR policies and whether balance should be sought between patent- 
and product-centric stakeholders. The antitrust implications of this dimension of SDO balance are 
subject to debates that are still in their early stages.  
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